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ABSTRACT
We prove that no fully transactional system can provide fast read
transactions (including read-only ones that are considered the most
frequent in practice). Specifically, to achieve fast read transactions,
the system has to give up support of transactions that write more
than one object. We prove this impossibility result for distributed
storage systems that are causally consistent, i.e., they do not require
to ensure any strong form of consistency. Therefore, our result holds
also for any system that ensures a consistency level stronger than
causal consistency, e.g., strict serializability. The impossibility result
holds even for systems that store only two objects (and support at
least two servers and at least four clients). It also holds for systems
that are partially replicated. Our result justifies the design choices
of state-of-the-art distributed transactional systems and insists
that system designers should not put more effort to design fully-
functional systems that support both fast read transactions and
ensure causal or any stronger form of consistency.
1 INTRODUCTION
Transactions represent a fundamental abstraction of distributed
storage systems, as they facilitate the task of building correct appli-
cations. For this reason, distributed transactional storage systems
are widely adopted in production environments [10, 32, 44, 47, 50,
53, 55] and actively researched in academia [19, 43, 57, 59, 62]. Be-
cause many applications exhibit read-dominated workloads [6, 17,
45, 46], read-only transactions are a particularly important build-
ing block of such systems. Hence, improving the performance
of distributed read-only transactions has become a key require-
ment for modern such systems and a much investigated research
topic [19, 39, 40]. To this end, the notion of fast read-only trans-
actions has been introduced in [40] and studied in subsequent
papers [22, 30, 58]. A fast read-only transaction satisfies the follow-
ing three desirable properties [40]: it completes in one round of
communication (one-round), it does not rely on blocking mecha-
nisms (nonblocking), and each server communicates to the client
only one value for each object that it stores locally and is being read
(one-value). Unfortunately, despite the huge effort put on designing
efficient distributed transactional systems, read-only transactions
in existing systems still suffer from performance limitations. For
example, systems like Spanner [19], DrTM [59], RoCoCo [43] im-
plement read-only transactions that may require multiple rounds
of communication, or rely on blocking mechanisms.
In systems that implement strong consistency, e.g., serializabil-
ity [15], transactions facilitate the task of writing distributed ap-
plications by giving the illusion that concurrent operations take
place sequentially. However, strong consistency comes at such a
high cost [11, 35] that, over the last years, a flurry of systems has
abandoned strong consistency in favor of weaker consistency mod-
els [18, 21, 38, 50]. Among them, causal consistency [2] has garnered
much attention, because it was expected to hit a sweet spot in the
performance versus ease-of-programming trade-off. Causal consis-
tency has intuitive semantics and eschews the synchronization that
is needed to achieve strong consistency in the presence of replicas.
It is also the strongest consistency level that can tolerate network
partitions without blocking operations [7, 49].
As expected, existing causally consistent storage systems achieve
higher performance in comparison to strong consistency systems [3,
25, 38, 39]. However, causally consistent read-only transactions
still suffer from latency overheads. In fact, state-of-the-art causally
consistent storage systems either do not support fast read-only
transactions [3, 25, 42, 54] (i.e., they do not exhibit all three desirable
properties) or they are of restricted functionality by not providing
multi-object write transactions [40].
Contributions. In this paper, we present a result proving a fun-
damental limitation of transactional systems. Specifically, our im-
possibility result states that no fully-functional, causally consistent
distributed transactional system can provide fast read-only trans-
actions (and therefore also fast read transactions). Specifically, to
achieve fast read transactions, the system has to give up support
of multi-object write transactions, i.e., it can only support transac-
tions that write at most one object. This result unveils an important
trade-off between the latency attainable by read-only transactions
and the functionality provided by a distributed storage system. It
also shows that the inefficiency of the existing systems to achieve
all the desirable properties (as described above) is not a coincidence.
Most theoretical results considered so far serializable transac-
tions instead of causally consistent that we consider here, and this
work includes a formalization of causally consistent transactional
systems which is interesting in its own right. Our result holds for
any system that ensures stronger consistency than causal consis-
tency. Moreover, our result is relevant for the broad class of systems
that use causal consistency as a building block to achieve their target
consistency level [13] or that implement hybrid consistency models
which include causal consistency [5, 34, 35, 56]. The impossibility
result holds for any system that supports at least two servers and
at least four clients. It holds even for systems that store only two
objects (each in a different server). We prove that the impossibility
result also holds for systems that are partially replicated.
To prove our impossibility result, we construct a troublesome
infinite execution in which a write-only transaction that is exe-
cuted solo never manages to make the values it writes visible. To
do so, we inductively construct an infinite number of non-empty
prefixes of the troublesome execution and prove that the written
values are not yet visible after each prefix has been executed; specif-
ically, some server has to send at least one more message before
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the values become visible. We argue this using indistinguishability
arguments [9, 41]. The fact that, on the one hand, the constructed
execution is infinite, and, on the other, that we focus on causal con-
sistency which is a rather weak consistency condition, introduces
complications that we have to cope with to get the proof.
In the case where the system has more than two servers, an extra
challenge is to cope with the chains of messages through which
information may be disseminated between the servers that store
the written objects. This complicates the construction of the execu-
tions that we prove to be indistinguishable from the troublesome
execution. To get the impossibility result for the case of a partially
replicated system, an additional complication is that we have to
construct an infinite sequence of server ids. These are the servers
that send the necessary messages in each step for the induction to
work. We also have to capture the fact that more than one servers
may now respond to the same read request of a client. Due to lack
of space, the general proof is provided in an attached appendix.
We study the limits of our impossibility result in all different
premises. We show that if we relax any of the considered properties,
then the impossibility result no longer holds.
Our impossibility result sheds light on some of the design deci-
sions of recent systems and provides useful information to system
designers. Specifically, they should not put more effort to devise a
fully-functional system that supports both fast read transactions
and ensures causal consistency (or any stronger consistency level).
Structure of the paper. Section 2 provides the model and useful
definitions. Section 3 presents our impossibility result and discusses
its limits in all different premises. Section 4 discusses related work.
Section 5 provides some conclusions.
2 MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
Storage system.We consider a distributed storage system which
stores a finite number of objects. There arem > 1 servers in the
system. Each server stores a non-empty set of these objects. For
simplicity, we assume that the set of objects stored in servers are
disjoint. (Our result holds even if the system is partially replicated,
i.e., if these sets are different but not disjoint, and none of them
contains all the objects.)
Transactions. An arbitrarily large number of clients may read
and/or write one ormore objects by executing transactions. To prove
our impossibility results, it is enough to focus on static transactions
whose read-sets and write-sets are known from the beginning of
the execution. (It follows that our impossibility result holds for
systems of dynamic transactions as well.) A (static) transactionT =
(RT ,WT ) reads the objects in its read-set, RT , and writes the objects
in its write-set,WT . IfWT = ∅, T is called a read-only transaction,
whereas ifRT = ∅,T is awrite-only transaction.We denote by r (X )x
a read on object X which returns value x and byw(X )x a write of
value x to object X . Also, we denote by r (X )∗ a read on object X
when the return value is unknown (with symbol ∗ as a place-holder).
Reads and writes on objects are called object operations.
In typical deployments, there are many more clients than servers.
Hence, allowing server-to-client out-of-band communication would
result in nonnegligible overhead on the servers, which would suffer
from reduced scalability and performance. For this reason, we natu-
rally assume that to execute a transaction, a client can communicate
with the servers (but not with other clients) and a server communi-
cates with a client only to respond to a client’s read or write request.
We find evidence of the relevance of this assumption in large-scale
production systems, such as Facebook’s data platform [45], and in
emerging systems [23, 29, 37] and architectures [36] for fast query
processing, where no per-client states are maintained to avoid the
corresponding overheads and to achieve the lowest latency.
System model. The system is asynchronous, i.e., the delay on mes-
sage transmission can be arbitrarily large and the processes do not
have access to a global clock. The system is modelled as an undi-
rected graph in the standard way [9, 41]. Each node of the graph
represents a process (i.e., a client or a server) whereas links connect
every pair of processes. Each process is modelled as a state machine
with its state containing a set of income and outcome buffers [9,
Ch. 2]1. Links do not lose, modify, inject, or duplicate messages.
Operation executions. An implementation of a storage system
provides algorithms, for each process, to execute reads and writes in
the context of transactions. A configuration represents an instance
of the system at some point in time. In an initial configuration
Qin , all processes are in initial states and all buffers are empty
(i.e., no message is in transit). There are two kinds of events in the
system: (1) a computation step taken by a process, in which the
process reads all messages residing in its income buffers, performs
some local computation and may send (at most) one message to
each of its neighboring processes, and (2) a delivery event, where
a message is removed from the outcome buffer of the source and
is placed in the income buffer of the destination. An execution is a
sequence of events (we assume that an execution also includes the
invocations and responses of transactions, as well as the invocations
and responses of object operations). An execution α is legal starting
from a configuration C , if, for every process p, every computation
step taken by p in α is compatible to p’s state machine (given p’s
state in C) and all messages sent are eventually received. Since the
system is asynchronous, the order in which the events appear in an
execution is assumed to be controlled by an adversary. A reachable
configuration is a configuration that results from the application of
a legal finite execution starting from an initial configuration. Given
a reachable configuration C , we say that a computation step s by a
process p eventually occurs, if in every legal execution starting from
C (in which p takes a sufficient number of steps), p executes s . For
every reachable configuration C and every legal execution α from
C , we denote by RC(C,α) the configuration that results from the
execution of α starting fromC . Two executions are indistinguishable
to a process p, if p executes the same steps in each of them. Two
configurations are indistinguishable to p, if p is in the same state in
both configurations. Given two executions α1 and α2, we denote by
α1 · α2 the concatenation of α1 with α2, i.e., α1 · α2 is an execution
consisting of all events of α1 followed by all events of α2 (in order).
Each client that invokes a transaction T may eventually return a
response. The response consists of a value for each object in RT , and
an ack for each writeT performs. We say thatT has completed (or is
complete), if the client c that invoked T has issued all read or write
requests for T , and has received responses by the servers for all
these requests. A transactionT is active in some configurationC if it
1 There is one income and one outcome buffer for each link incident to each process.
Income and outcome buffers store the messages that are sent or received through the
corresponding link, respectively.
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has been invoked beforeC and has not yet completed. We say that a
configurationC is quiescent if no transaction is active atC . LetC be
any reachable configuration that is either quiescent or only a single
transaction T , invoked by a client c , is active at C . We say that T
executes solo starting from C , if only c and the servers take steps
after C and c does not invoke any transaction other than T after
C . We say that a value x is written in an execution α if there exists
some transaction T in α that issuesw(X )x for some object X . For
convenience, every execution we consider, starts with the execution
of two initial transactions, T in0 = (w(X0)x in0 ) (invoked by a client
cin0 ) and T
in
1 = (w(X1)x in1 ) (invoked by a client cin1 ) that write the
initial values x in0 and x
in
1 in objects X0 and X1, respectively.
Causal Consistency.We consider an implementation of a transac-
tional storage system that is causally consistent [2, 51]. Informally,
causal consistency ensures that causally-related transactions should
appear, to all processes, like if they have been executed in the same
order. The formal definitions below closely follow those presented
for causally consistent transactional memory systems in [26].
The historyH (α) of an execution α is the subsequence of α which
contains only the invocations and responses of object operations
(we omit α whenever it is clear from the context). A transaction T
is in H , if H contains at least one invocation of an object operation
by T . A transaction is complete in H if it is complete in α . For
each client c , we denote by Hc the subsequence of H containing all
invocations and responses of object operations issued or received
by c . Given two executions α and α ′, the histories H (α) and H (α ′)
are equivalent, if for each client c , Hc (α) = Hc (α ′). For each client
c , the program-order, denoted by <H |c , is a relation on transactions
in Hc such that for any two transactions T1,T2, T1 <H |c T2 if and
only if T1 precedes T2 in Hc .
We denote by complete(H ) the subsequence of all events in
H issued and received by complete transactions2. We denote by
comm(H ) a history that extends H : (1) comm(H ) = H ·H ′′, i.e., H is
a prefix of comm(H ), (2) H ′′ contains only the responses for those
write operations in H for which there is no response.
A transactionT1 precedes another transactionT2 in α (or inH (α)),
if T1 completes before T2 is invoked. Similarly, an object operation
op1 precedes another object operation op2 in α (or in H (α)), if the
response of op1 precedes the invocation of op2. An execution σ
is sequential if for every two transactions T1, T2 in σ , either T1
precedesT2 or vice versa. We define a sequential history in a similar
way.
Consider a sequential execution σ (legal fromQin ) and a transac-
tionT in σ . We say thatT is legal in σ , if for every invocation r (X )v
of a read operation on any object X that T performs, the following
hold: (1) if there is an invocation of a write operation by T that
precedes r (X )v in σ then v is the value argument of the last such
invocation, (2) otherwise, if there are no transactions preceding T
in σ which invoke write for object X , then v is the initial value for
X , (3) otherwise, v is the value argument of the last invocation of a
write operation to X , by any transaction that precedes T in σ .
Consider any sequential history S that is equivalent to H . We
define a binary relation with respect to S , called reads-from and
denoted by <rS , on transactions in H such that, for any two distinct
2We assume that in a system that supports causal or any weaker form of consistency,
all transactions commit [12, 39].
transactions T1,T2 in H , T1 <rS T2 if and only if: (1) T2 executes
a read operation op that reads some object X and returns a value
v for it, and (2) T1 is the transaction in S which executes the last
write operation that writesv forX and precedesT2. Each sequential
history S that is equivalent to H , induces a reads-from relation for
H . Let RH be the set of all reads-from relations that can be induced
for H (by considering all equivalent to H sequential histories).
We say that a sequential history S respects some relation < on
the set of transactions in H if it holds that for any two transactions
T1, T2 in S , if T1 < T2, then T1 precedes T2 in S .
For each <r in RH , we define the causal relation for <r on trans-
actions in H to be the transitive closure of
⋃
c
(
<H |c
)
∪ <r . We
denote by CH the set of all causal relations in H .
Definition 1 (Causal consistency). An execution α is causally
consistent if for history H ′ = comm(H (α)), there exists a causal
relation <c in Ccomplete(H ′) such that, for each client ci , there
exists a sequential execution σi such that:
• H (σi ) is equivalent to complete(H ′),
• H (σi ) respects the causality order <c , and
• every transaction executed by ci in H (σi ) is legal.
An implementation is causally consistent if each execution α it
produces is causally consistent.
Intuitively, a causally consistent distributed transactional system
produces executions that respect the causality order. For simplicity,
assume that all values written in an execution α are distinct. Then,
if a client c reads x0 and x1 for two objectsX0 andX1, and x0 <c x1,
then there is no x ′0 such that x0 <
c x ′0 <
c x1. The necessity to talk
about sets of reads-from relations and sets of causal relations above
comes from the fact that the values written in an execution α are
not necessarily distinct.
Progress. To avoid trivial implementations in which every read-
only transaction invoked by any client always returns ⊥ or values
written by the same client, we introduce the concept of value visi-
bility.
Definition 2 (Value visibility). Consider any object X and let C
be any reachable configuration which is either quiescent or just
a write-only transaction (by a client cw ) writing a value x into X
(and possibly performing additional writes) is active in C .
Value x is visible in C , if and only if: in every legal execution
starting from C which contains just a read-only transaction Tr
(invoked by a client c < {cw , cin0 , cin1 }) that reads X , x is returned
as X ’s value for Tr .
We focus on storage systems that ensure minimal progress for
write-only transactions. This is a weak progress property ensured
even by systems in which write transactions are blocking. So, our
impossibility result holds also for systems that ensure any stronger
progress properties for write-only transactions (and without any
restriction on progress for transactions that both read and write).
Definition 3 (Minimal Progress for write-only transactions). Let
Tw be any write-only transaction which writes a value x into an
object X (Tw may also write other objects). If Tw executes solo,
starting from any reachable quiescent configuration C , then there
exists a later configuration C ′ such that x is visible in C ′.
We denote byQ0 a reachable configuration in which both values
x in0 and x
in
1 , written by the transactions T
in
0 and T
in
1 discussed
earlier, are visible. Definition 3 implies that Q0 is well-defined.
3
We next present the definition of fast read-only transactions.
Definition 4 expresses the exact same properties as in the original
definition which was introduced in [40] and used in [22, 30, 58].
Definition 4 (Fast read-only transaction). We say that an imple-
mentation of a distributed storage system supports fast read-only
transactions, if in each execution α it produces, the following hold
for every read-only transaction T executed in α :
(1) Non-blocking and One-Roundtrip Property. The client
c which invoked T sends a message to all servers storing
items that it wants to read and it does so in one compu-
tational step; moreover, each server performs at most one
computational step to serve the request and respond to c .
(2) One-value messages. Each message sent from a server to
a client contains only one value that has been written by
some write transaction in α into an object that is stored in
the server and is read by the client3.
3 THE IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT
In this section, we prove the impossibility result:
Theorem 1. No causally consistent implementation of a trans-
actional storage system supports transactions that write to multiple
objects and fast read-only transactions.
The impossibility result holds even for systems that store just
two objects X0 and X1. For ease of presentation, we prove it for
a system with two servers p0 and p1. However, it can easily be
extended to hold for the general case, where the system has any
number of servers and is partially-replicated (see the appendix for
the general proof). We assume that p0 stores X0 and p1 stores X1.
3.1 Outline of the Proof
We prove Theorem 1 by the way of contradiction. Table 2 in Ap-
pendix reports the list of the main symbols used throughout the
proof. Assume that there exists a causally consistent implemen-
tation Π which supports fast read-only transactions and transac-
tions that write multiple objects. Assume also that Π guarantees
minimal progress for write-only transactions. We derive a con-
tradiction by showing that there exists a troublesome execution
which breaks minimal progress. Specifically, we construct an in-
finite execution α which contains just a write-only transaction
Tw = (w(X0)x0,w(X1)x1), invoked by some client cw < {cin0 , cin1 },
and we show that the values x0 and x1 written byTw never become
visible. Intuitively, to do so, we inductively construct an infinite
number of non-empty distinct prefixes of α and prove that the writ-
ten values are not yet visible after each prefix has been executed.
Specifically, we use indistinguishability arguments [9, 41] to prove
that after the execution of each such prefix, some server has to still
send at least one message before the values become visible.
We now provide an informal, high-level outline of the proof. We
start with two simple lemmas. The first shows that a transaction
which reads X0 and X1 cannot return a subset of the values written
by Tw (i.e., it returns either the new values for both objects or the
initial values for both objects). The second lemma shows that if
one of the values written by Tw is not visible, then both values
3We remark that the message may also contain some metadata (e.g., a timestamp), as
long as these metadata do not reveal any information about other transactions and
additional written values to the client.
Figure 1: Configurations Qin , Q0 and C0.
written by Tw are not visible. We use these lemmas to determine
the values read by read-only transactions in the executions that
we use. Specifically, we present two execution constructions that
are useful in the proof of Theorem 1. Construction 1 describes an
execution in which a read-only transaction reads the initial values
for X0 and X1, whereas Construction 2 describes an execution in
which a read-only transaction reads the new values for X0 and X1.
The two constructions are used to build an execution γ which
allows us to derive a contradiction: In γ , a read-only transaction
reads a mix of old and new values for X0 and X1. We use γ to prove,
in the induction, that the values written by Tw are not yet visible.
We also prove that to make them visible, p0 and p1 have to exchange
more messages. Therefore, after any arbitrary but finite number of
steps, Tw has not yet completed and the values written by it has
not yet become visible, which contradicts eventual visibility.
3.2 Useful Constructions and Lemmas
To enforce a causal relation between the values written by cw inTw
and x in0 , x
in
1 , the troublesome execution starts with the execution of
a read-only transaction T inr = (r (X0)∗, r (X1)∗) by cw (applied from
Q0). Since T inr is a fast read-only transaction, T inr completes; since
x in0 and x
in
1 are visible in Q0 (by definition), cw returns (x in0 ,x in1 )
for T inr . Let C0 be the configuration in which T inr has completed
and no message is in transit. The configurations Qin , Q0, C0 are
shown in Figure 1. All executions we refer to below start from
C0. We now present the two lemmas that will be useful for the
constructions and the proof of Theorem 1. The first states that in an
execution in which a write transaction writes new values to a set
of objects, a read transaction which reads these objects, cannot see
only a subset of the new values. The proof comes as an immediate
consequence of the fact that Π ensures causal consistency.
Lemma 1. Let τ be any legal execution of Π starting fromC0 which
contains two transactions: client cw invokes a write-only transaction
Tw = (w(X0)x0,w(X1)x1), and a client cr , cw invokes a read-only
transactionTr = (r (X0)∗, r (X1)∗)which completes in τ . Letv0 andv1
be the two values which cr returns forTr , i.e.,Tr = (r (X0)v0, r (X1)v1).
Then, either v0 = x0 and v1 = x1, or v0 = x in0 and v1 = x
in
1 .
Proof of Lemma 1. To derive a contradiction, assume that there
exists some execution τ of Π starting from C0 and some i ∈ {0, 1}
for which cr returns the values vi = xi ,v1−i = x in1−i for Tr .
By causal consistency, cr ’s local history in τ respects causality.
So, we can totally orderT in1−i ,Tw andTr such that (1)T
in
1−i is the last
transaction which writes to X1−i and precedes Tr , so Tw (which
also writes X1−i ) precedesT in1−i ; (2)Tw is the last transaction which
writes on Xi and precedes Tr , so Tw is ordered before Tr ; and (3)
T in1−i is ordered beforeTw because cw reads the value written inT
in
1−i
before it initiates Tw (as shown in Figure 1). A contradiction. □
The next lemma states that in an execution in which a write
transaction Tw writes new values in a set of objects, if one of the
values written byTw is not visible at some configuration, then both
values written by Tw are not visible in that configuration.
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Lemma 2. Let τ be any legal execution starting from C0 which
contains just one transaction: client cw executes a write-only transac-
tion Tw = (w(X0)x0,w(X1)x1). Let C be any reachable configuration
when τ is applied from C0. If either x0 or x1 is not visible in C , then
there exists at least one client cr < {cw , cin0 , cin1 } such that if, starting
fromC , cr executes a fast read-only transactionTr = (r (X0)∗, r (X1)∗),
then cr returns (x in0 ,x in1 ) for Tr .
Proof of Lemma 2. To derive a contradiction, consider some
configuration C , reachable when τ is applied from C0, in which at
least one of the values x0 and x1 is not visible, and assume that
for every client cr < {cw , cin0 , cin1 }, if cr invokes Tr starting from
C , then cr does not return (x in0 ,x in1 ) for Tr . Notice that since Π
ensures that read-only transactions are fast, Tr completes. Then by
Lemma 1, cr returns (x0,x1). Since this holds for every client cr not
in {cw , cin0 , cin1 }, Definition 2 implies that at C both x0 and x1 are
visible. This contradicts the hypothesis that at least one of the two
values is not visible in C . □
Notice that Lemma 2 holds for C = C0, i.e., when τ is empty.
We now present Constructions 1 and 2 which are illustrated in
Figure 2. Roughly speaking, the constructions illustrate two execu-
tions in which a write-only transaction Tw writes values x0 and x1
to objects X0 and X1, respectively, and a read-only transaction Tr
reads X0 and X1. The executions are constructed so that Tr returns
(x in0 ,x in1 ) in the first execution, whereas it returns (x0,x1) in the
second. Based on these constructions, we construct, in the proof of
Theorem 1, an execution where Tr returns a mix of initial and new
values, allowing us to derive a contradiction. The constructions are
based on a fixed i ∈ {0, 1} and a client cr that executes transaction
Tr . Each time the construction is employed in the proof of Theo-
rem 1 these parameters can be different. Although these executions
are similar, we present both of them for ease of presentation.
We start with an intuitive description of Construction 1 which
is depicted in Figure 2(a). Assume, without loss of generality, that
i = 0. (The construction when i = 1 is symmetric.) The construction
produces an execution in which Tw starts executing from C0 and
runs solo up to any configuration C in which x0 is not yet visible.
Next,Tr is initiated fromC and takes steps until it sends a message
to both servers. The adversary schedules the receipt of these mes-
sages so that p0 receives the message first and sends a response.
Then, p1 receives the message sent by cr and sends back a response.
Finally, cr takes steps to collect these responses and return. We call
σold the part of the execution starting from C until the point that
p0 sends a response, and γold the suffix of the execution starting
from C . Lemma 2 allows us to argue that cr returns (x in0 ,x in1 ) in
γold . We next present the formalism of the construction.
Construction 1 (Construction of execution γold (C,pi , cr ) and exe-
cution σold (C,pi , cr )). Let τ be any arbitrary legal execution start-
ing from C0 which contains just one transaction: client cw exe-
cutes a write-only transaction Tw = (w(X0)x0,w(X1)x1). Fix any
i ∈ {0, 1}. For every configuration C that is reached when τ is
applied from C0 in which the value xi is not visible, Lemma 2 im-
plies that there exists at least one client cr < {cw , cin0 , cin1 } such
that if, starting from C , cr executes a fast read-only transaction
Tr = (r (X0)∗, r (X1)∗), then cr returns (x in0 ,x in1 ) for Tr . For every
such client cr , we define γold (C,pi , cr ) to be the execution con-
taining all of the events described below. In γold (C,pi , cr ), first cr
invokes Tr starting from C . So, cr takes steps and since it reads
X0 and X1, cr sends a messagemo0(C,pi , cr ) to p0 and a message
mo1(C,pi , cr ) to p1. Next, the adversary schedules the delivery of
moi (C,pi , cr ) and let pi take a step and receivemoi (C,pi , cr ). Since
Tr is a fast transaction, once pi receivesmoi (C,pi , cr ), pi sends a
responsemo′i (C,pi , cr ) to cr . Denote by σold (C,pi , cr ) the prefix of
γold (C,pi , cr ) up until the step in which pi sends the response. Af-
ter σold (C,pi , cr ) has been applied fromC , the adversary schedules
the delivery ofmo1−i (C,pi , cr ), and lets p1−i take steps to receive
mo1−i (C,pi , cr ) and send a response to cr . Finally, cr take steps to
receive the responses from p0 and p1 and return a response for Tr .
By the way γold (C,pi , cr ) is constructed and by Lemma 2, we
get the following.
Observation 1. The following claims hold:
(1) Execution γold (C,pi , cr ) is legal from C .
(2) Only processes pi and cr take steps in σold (C,pi , cr ), so con-
figurations C and RC(C,σold (C,pi , cr )) are indistinguishable
to cw and p1−i .
(3) The return value for Tr in γold (C,pi , cr ) is (x in0 ,x in1 ).
Construction 2 is depicted in Figure 2(b). Again, assume, without
loss of generality, that i = 0. (The construction for the case where
i = 1 is symmetric.) The construction produces an execution in
which Tw starts its execution from C0 and runs solo up to any
configuration C in which x1 is visible. Then, Tr is initiated from C
and cr takes steps until it sends a message to each of the servers.
The adversary schedules the delivery of these messages so that
p1 receives the message first and sends back a response. Then, p0
receives the message sent by cr and sends back a response. Finally,
cr takes steps to collect these responses and return. We call σnew
the part of this construction starting from C until the point that
p1 sends a response, and γnew the suffix of this execution starting
fromC . We later argue (in Observation 2) that cr returns (x0,x1) in
γold . We next present the formalism of the construction.
Construction 2 (Construction of execution γnew (C,pi , cr ) and ex-
ecution σnew (C,pi , cr )). Let τ be any legal execution starting from
C0 which contains just one transaction: client cw executes a write-
only transaction Tw = (w(X0)x0,w(X1)x1). Fix any i ∈ {0, 1} and
let cr be any client not in {cw , cin0 , cin1 }. For every reachable config-
urationC when τ is applied fromC0 in which xi is visible, we define
γnew (C,pi , cr ) to be the execution containing all of the events de-
scribed below. In γnew , cr invokes Tr starting from C and takes
steps until it sends a messagemn0(C,pi , cr ) to p0 and a message
mn1(C,pi , cr ) to p1. Let Cnew (C,pi , cr ) be the resulting configura-
tion. Next, the adversary schedules the delivery ofmn1−i (C,pi , cr )
and let p1−i take a step to receive mn1−i (C,pi , cr ). Since Tr is a
fast transaction, once p1−i receivesmn1−i (C,pi , cr ), it sends a re-
sponsemn′1−i (C,pi , cr ) to cr . This sequence of steps starting from
Cnew (C,pi , cr ) to the step in which p1−i sends the response is de-
noted by σnew (C,pi , cr ). Next, the adversary schedules the delivery
ofmni (C,pi , cr ) and lets pi take steps until it receivesmni (C,pi , cr )
and sends a response to cr . Finally, cr takes steps to receive the
responses from p0 and p1 and return a response for Tr .
By the way γnew (C,pi , cr ) is constructed, by Definition 2 and by
Lemma 1, we get the following.
Observation 2. The following claims hold for γnew (C,pi , cr ):
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(a) Construction 1 (b) Construction 2
Figure 2: Illustration of Constructions 1 and 2.
(1) Execution γnew (C,pi , cr ) is legal from C .
(2) ConfigurationsC and RC(C,γnew (C,pi , cr )) are indistinguish-
able to cw and pi .
(3) The return value for Tr in γnew (C,pi , cr ) is (x0,x1).
3.3 The Infinite Execution
Recall that we prove Theorem 1 by constructing an infinite execu-
tion α which contains just one write-only transaction Tw and by
proving that in α , the values written by Tw never becomes visible.
We construct α in Lemma 3 using induction . Specifically, the lemma
shows that there is an infinite sequence of executions α1,α2, . . .
such that, all of them are distinct prefixes of α (we let α0 be the
empty execution). Lemma 3 is comprised of two claims which hold
for every integer k ≥ 0. The first, shows that αk contains the trans-
mission of at least one message which is sent after the execution
of αk−1 from C0 (and thus, αk−1 is a prefix of αk and αk−1 , αk ).
The second shows that after αk has been performed from C0, the
two values written by Tw have not yet become visible. Although
the proofs of the two claims exhibit many similarities, for clarity of
presentation, we have decided not to merge them into one proof.
Lemma 3. For any integer k ≥ 1, there exists an execution αk , legal
from C0, in which only one transaction Tw = (w(X0)x0,w(X1)x1) is
executed by client cw . Let Ck be the configuration that results when
αk is applied from C0. Then, the following hold:
(1) αk = αk−1 · α ′k , where in α ′k at least one of the following
occurs:
• a message is sent by pk%2 to p(k−1)%2, or
• a message is sent by pk%2 to cw and it holds that after cw
receives this message, cw sends a message to p(k−1)%2.
(2) In Ck , x0 and x1 are not visible and Tw is still active.
Proof of Lemma 3. By induction on k . We prove the base case
together with the induction step, yet we clearly state the difference
when the proof diverges. To prove the induction step, fix an integer
k > 1 and assume that the claim holds for any j, 1 ≤ j < k .
Proof of claim 1.We start with claim 1. We start with a high-
level description of the claim’s proof. The proof is by contradiction.
We come up with two executions that have the following properties.
In the first execution, a read-only transactionTr = (r (X0)∗, r (X1)∗)
(initiated by a client ckr < {cin0 , cin1 , cw }) is executed starting from
Ck−1. Since x0 and x1 are not visible neither inC0 (sinceTw has not
yet started its execution in C0), nor in Ck−1 if k > 1 (by induction
hypothesis), the response forTr in this execution is (x in0 ,x in1 ). This
execution is constructed based on Construction 1. In the second
execution, ckr invokesTr afterTw has executed solo long enough so
that both values x0 and x1 are visible (minimal progress for write-
only transactions implies that visibility of x0 and x1 will eventually
happen). So, ckr returns (x0,x1) forTr in this execution. The second
execution is constructed based on Construction 2. We then combine
parts of these two executions to get a third execution, γ . Execution
γ is constructed so that we can prove that in it, ckr will return the
same value for Xk%2 as ckr does in the first execution, and the same
value for X(k−1)%2 as ckr does in the second execution. Therefore,
in γ , ckr returns (x ink%2,x(k−1)%2) for Tr . This contradicts Lemma 1.
We continue with the details of the proof of claim 1. To derive
a contradiction, assume that the claim does not hold, i.e., we let
cw ,p0,p1 take steps starting from Ck−1 and assume the following:
• pk%2 sends no message to p(k−1)%2;
• pk%2 sends no message to cw for which it holds that after cw
receives it, pk%2 sends a message to p(k−1)%2.
Since x0 and x1 are not visible neither inC0 nor inCk−1, Lemma 2
implies that there exists at least one client ckr < {cw , cin0 , cin1 } such
that if, starting from Ck−1, ckr executes a read-only transaction
Tr = (r (X0)∗, r (X1)∗), then ckr returns (x in0 ,x in1 ) for Tr . We derive
the contradiction by constructing the execution γ , in which, in
addition toTw , ckr executes such a read-only transactionTr , and by
showing that γ contradicts Lemma 1.
To construct γ , we need to define an execution β and a subse-
quence βnew of it. Specifically, βnew is utilized as part of execution
γ . Roughly speaking, γ starts with σold (Ck−1,pk%2, ckr ) (see Con-
struction 1) up to the point thatpk%2 reportsx ink%2 forXk%2 to c
k
r (see
Observation 1). Recall that only processes ckr and pk%2 take steps in
σold (Ck−1,pk%2, ckr ) (by Observation 1). Then, the events of βnew
are executed to take the system in a configuration where x0 and x1
are visible. The assumptionwemade above to derive a contradiction,
allows us to design βnew so that, ckr and pk%2 do not take any steps
in it, and the values written by Tw are visible after βnew is applied
starting fromCk−1 (as well as from RC(Ck−1,σold (Ck−1,pk%2, ckr ))).
Afterwards, an executionγnew , which is derived based on Construc-
tion 2, is applied from the resulting configuration. In γnew only
process p(k−1)%2 take steps (see Observation 2). Execution βnew
has been designed so that p(k−1)%2 is "unaware" of pk%2’s decision
on what to report to ckr as the current value of the object that
pk%2 stores. So, p(k−1)%2 reports x(k−1)%2 for X(k−1)%2 as it does in
Construction 2 (Observation 2). The construction of γ concludes
with ckr taking steps until Tr responds. We argue (below) that ckr
receives in γ the same message regarding the value of Xk%2 as in
γold (Ck−1,pk%2, ckr ), so it returns x ink%2 forXk%2 (by Observation 1).
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(a) Execution β and its subsequences (b) Execution γ
Figure 3: Executions β and γ . Execution β consists of the steps taken by cw , pi and p1−i from configuration C0, where x0 and x1
are not visible yet, to Cv , where these two values become visible.
We also argue that ckr receives in γ the same message regarding the
value of X(k−1)%2 as in γnew , so it returns x(k−1)%2 for X(k−1)%2 (by
Observation 2). This contradicts Lemma 1.
We first define β . For the base case (where k = 1), cw invokesTw
starting from C0 and executes solo (i.e., only cw ,p0,p1 take steps)
until x0 and x1 are visible; sinceTw has not yet been invoked inC0,
x0 and x1 are not visible inC0. For the induction step, the induction
hypothesis (claim 2) implies that in Ck−1, x0 and x1 are not visible.
Again, we let cw execute solo, starting from Ck−1, until x0 and
x1 are visible (minimal progress implies that this will eventually
happen). In either case, let Cv be the first configuration after Ck−1
in which x0 and x1 are visible. Let β be the sequence of steps taken
from Ck−1 to Cv (all of them are by cw and the servers).
In this and the next two paragraphs, we define βnew and show
that it is legal from Ck−1. Let β ′p be the shortest prefix of β which
contains all messages sent by cw to p(k−1)%2, and let β ′s be the
remaining suffix of β . Let βp be the subsequence of β ′p in which all
steps taken by pk%2 have been removed. Let βs be the subsequence
of β ′s containing only steps by p(k−1)%2. Let βnew be βp · βs . Note
that βnew does not contain any step by pk%2. Executions β , βp and
βs are illustrated in Figure 3a. In the figure, symbols i, 1− i ∈ {0, 1}
refer to k%2 and (k − 1)%2 respectively.
To show that βnew is legal from Ck−1, we first argue that βp
is legal from Ck−1. Because β ′p is a prefix of β , β ′p is legal from
Ck−1. By assumption, pk%2 sends no message to p(k−1)%2, so if
p(k−1)%2 receives any message from pk%2 in β ′p , then the message
must have been sent before Ck−1 (and must have been received
after it), i.e., the message is not sent in β ′p . (For the base case, since
no message is in transit in C0, p(k−1)%2 receives no message from
pk%2 in β ′p .) Moreover, by assumption, after αk−1, pk%2 sends no
message to cw for which it holds that after cw receives it, cw sends
a message to p(k−1)%2. Since, by definition, β ′p ends with a message
sent by cw to p(k−1)%2 (if β ′p is not empty), it follows that: for
the base case, cw receives no message from pk%2 in β ′p ; for the
induction step, if cw receives any message from pk%2 in β ′p , then
themessage has been sent beforeCk−1. Thus, βp , which results from
the removal of all steps taken by pk%2 from β ′p , is legal from Ck−1.
Moreover, RC(Ck−1, β ′p ) and RC(Ck−1, βp ) (i.e., the configurations
that result when β ′p and βp , respectively, are applied from Ck−1)
are indistinguishable to p(k−1)%2 and cw .
To complete the argument that βnew is legal from Ck−1, it re-
mains to prove that βs is legal from RC(Ck−1, βp ). By definition,
only p(k−1)%2 takes steps in βs . Note that, because RC(Ck−1, β ′p )
and RC(Ck−1, βp ) are indistinguishable to p(k−1)%2, by proving
that βs is legal from RC(Ck−1, β ′p ), it follows that βs is legal from
RC(Ck−1, βp ). We next argue that βs is indeed legal from configura-
tion RC(Ck−1, β ′p ). By assumption, if p(k−1)%2 receives any message
from pk%2 in βs , then the message has been sent before Ck−1 (i.e.,
the message has not been sent in β). For the base case, since no
message is in transit inC0, p(k−1)%2 receives no message from pk%2
in βs . Recall that, by definition of β ′p , all messages from cw to
p(k−1)%2 are sent by the end of β ′p . Therefore, cw does not send any
message to p(k−1)%2 in β ′s . So, any message that p(k−1)%2 receives
from cw in βs has been sent by the end of β ′p . Thus, βs is legal
from RC(Ck−1, β ′p ), and since RC(Ck−1, β ′p ) and RC(Ck−1, βp ) are
indistinguishable to p(k−1)%2, βs is also legal from RC(Ck−1, βp ).
Therefore, βnew = βp · βs is legal from Ck−1.
From the arguments above, it also follows that RC(Ck−1, βp · βs )
andCv = RC(Ck−1, β ′p ·β ′s ) are indistinguishable to p(k−1)%2. There-
fore, RC(Ck−1, βnew ) and Cv are indistinguishable to p(k−1)%2.
We continue to constructγ . To do so, we useσold (Ck−1,pk%2, ckr )
(Construction 1), βnew , and σnew (Cv ,pk%2, ckr ) (Construction 2).
We also refer to configuration Cnew (Cv ,pk%2, ckr ) (Construction 2).
Figure 3b illustrates the construction of γ , where symbols i, 1 − i ∈
{0, 1} refer to k%2 and (k − 1)%2 respectively. (For simplicity, we
omit (Ck−1,pk%2, ckr ) and (Cv ,pk%2, ckr ) from the notations below.)
Recall that in γ , a client starts a read-only transaction fromCk−1.
One server responds to the client first (i.e., σold is applied from
Ck−1). Then the write-only transaction makes progress and the
values written turn to be visible (specifically, βnew is applied after
σold ). Then the other server receives the request of the read-only
transaction and responds to the client (specifically, σnew is applied).
Recall that (as we argue below) to one server, γ is indistinguishable
from γold (i.e., the execution illustrated in Figure 3b is indistin-
guishable from that in Figure 2a) and thus the server returns an old
value, while to the other server, γ is indistinguishable from γnew
(i.e., the execution illustrated in Figure 3b is indistinguishable from
that in Figure 2b) and thus the other server returns a new value.
This then leads to the contradiction.
We are now ready to formally define γ . Starting from Ck−1, the
adversary applies σold (Ck−1,pk%2, ckr ) · βnew ·σnew (Cv ,pk%2, ckr ))
(we later prove that the application of these steps from Ck−1 is
legal). By Construction 1, in the last step of σold , pk%2 sends a
messagemo′k%2 to c
k
r . Similarly, by Construction 2, in the last step
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of σnew , p(k−1)%2 sends a messagemn′(k−1)%2 to c
k
r . The adversary
next schedules the delivery ofmo′k%2 andmn
′
(k−1)%2, and lets c
k
r
take steps until Tr completes (this will happen because Tr is a fast
transaction). This concludes the construction of γ .
We now argue that γ is legal. By construction, only processes
ckr and pk%2 take steps in σold . By Observation 1 (claim 2), Ck−1
and RC(Ck−1,σold ) are indistinguishable to cw and p(k−1)%2. Since
only cw and p(k−1)%2 take steps in βnew , it follows that βnew is
legal from RC(Ck−1,σold ). Since the processes that take steps
in σold and βnew are disjoint, then RC(Ck−1,σold · βnew ) and
RC(Ck−1, βnew · σold ) are indistinguishable to all processes. Re-
call that RC(Ck−1, βnew ) and Cv are indistinguishable to p(k−1)%2.
Since σold is composed of a sequence of steps in which only ckr
and pk%2 take steps, RC(Cv ,σold ) and Cnew (Cv ,pk%2, ckr ) are in-
distinguishable to p(k−1)%2. It follows that RC(Ck−1, βnew · σold )
and Cnew (Cv ,pk%2, ckr ) are indistinguishable to p(k−1)%2. Because
only p(k−1)%2 takes steps in σnew and σnew is legal from Cnew (by
definition), it follows that σnew is legal from RC(Ck−1,σold · βnew ).
Therefore, γ is legal.
We now focus on the values returned by ckr for Tr in γ . In γ , ckr
executes only transaction Tr . Thus, ckr decides the response for Tr
based solely on the values included inmo′k%2 (sent by pk%2 in σold )
andmn′(k−1)%2 (sent by p(k−1)%2 in σnew ). For the base case,mo
′
k%2
is sent before cw takes any step, somo′k%2 contains neither x0 nor x1.
For the induction step, sincemo′k%2 is sent in γold , by Observation
1 and the one-value messages property, mo′k%2 contains neither
x0 nor x1. Recall thatmn′(k−1)%2 is sent in γnew . By Observation 2
and the one-value messages property,mn′(k−1)%2 contains the value
x(k−1)%2. Recall that (by assumption) ckr does not receive any other
messages from p0 and p1. Thus, ckr receives for Xk%2 just one value,
namely, the same value it receives for it inγold . Similarly, it receives
for X(k−1)%2 just one value, namely, the same value it receives for it
in γnew . It follows that in γ , the values that ckr returns are x ink%2 for
Xk%2 and x(k−1)%2 for X(k−1)%2. This contradicts Lemma 1. (Note
that γ is an execution utilized just for proving claim 1; for every
k > 1, we build it from scratch to prove the induction step for k .)
Definition of αk andCk .We now define αk andCk . By claim 1, it
follows that in any legal execution starting from Ck−1 in which cw
executes solo, at least one of the following two statements hold: (1)
pk%2 sends a message to p(k−1)%2; (2) pk%2 sends a message to cw so
that after cw receives this message, cw sends a message to p(k−1)%2.
Letmsk be the first message that satisfies any of the two statements
above. We construct execution α ′k as follows. In α
′
k , Tw executes
solo starting from Ck−1 untilmsk is sent4. Let αk = αk−1 · α ′k , and
letCk be the configuration that results when αk is applied fromC0.
Proof of claim 2. To prove claim 2, we use similar arguments as
those in the proof of claim 1. We assume that claim 2 does not
hold, i.e., we assume that in Ck , xi is visible for some i ∈ {0, 1}.
To derive a contradiction, we construct an execution δ (in a way
similar to that we constructγ ) and show that δ contradicts Lemma 1.
We first define executions ρ and ρnew in a way similar to β and
4Clearly, in α ′k , pk%2 must take at least one step. For the case where k ≥ 2, we also
require that in α ′k , in the first step which pk%2 takes, messagemsk−1 is delivered at
pk%2 (in order to comply with our model of finite message delay).
βnew defined in the proof of claim 1. We finally define δ based on
σold (Ck−1,pk%2, ckr ), ρnew , and σnew (Ck ,pk%2, ckr ), and we argue
that in δ , ckr returns a response for Tr that contradicts Lemma 1.
We now present the details of the proof of claim 2. Assume that
in Ck , xi is visible for some i ∈ {0, 1}. We construct δ by utiliz-
ing executions σold (Ck−1,pk%2, ckr ) and γold (Ck−1,pk%2, ckr ) (Con-
struction 1), as well as σnew (Ck ,pk%2, ckr ) and γnew (Ck ,pk%2, ckr )
(Construction 2). By Observation 1, ckr returns x in(k−1)%2 forX(k−1)%2
and x ink%2 for Xk%2 for Tr in γold (Ck−1,pk%2, ckr ). Because by as-
sumption, xi is visible at Ck , Observation 2 implies that ckr returns
x(k−1)%2 forX(k−1)%2 andxk%2 forXk%2 forTr inγnew (Ck ,pk%2, ckr ).
To construct δ , we first define an execution ρ and some subse-
quences of it, and we study their properties. (The construction of ρ
and its subsequences is similar to that of β and its subsequences.
Yet, the reasoning of why the construction is legal is different, and
thus worth-presenting.) Let ρ be the sequence of steps which are
taken from Ck−1 to Ck , i.e., ρ = α ′k . Let ρ
′
p be the shortest prefix
of ρ which contains all messages sent by cw to p(k−1)%2, and let ρ ′s
be the remaining suffix of ρ. Let ρp be the subsequence of ρ ′p in
which all steps taken by pk%2 have been removed. Let ρs be the
subsequence of ρ ′s containing only steps by p(k−1)%2. Let ρnew be
ρp · ρs . We utilize ρnew as part of our construction of δ below (as
we did with βnew and γ ). In the next two paragraphs, we argue
that ρnew is legal from Ck−1.
We first argue that ρp is legal fromCk−1. Because ρ ′p is a prefix of
ρ, ρ ′p is legal fromCk−1. For the base case (k = 1), since no message
is in transit inC0, the definition of αk implies that p(k−1)%2 receives
no message from pk%2 in ρ ′p . For the induction step, the definition
of αk implies that if p(k−1)%2 receives any message from pk%2 in ρ ′p ,
then the message has been sent beforeCk−1, i.e., the message is not
sent in ρ ′p . Moreover, by definition of α ′k , pk%2 sends no message
to cw for which it holds that after the receipt of this message, cw
sends a message to p(k−1)%2. Since, by definition, ρ ′p ends with a
message sent by cw to p(k−1)%2 (if ρ ′p is not empty), it follows that:
for the base case, cw receives no message from pk%2 in ρ ′p ; for the
induction step, if cw receives anymessage frompk%2 in ρ ′p , then the
message has been sent before Ck−1. Thus, ρp , which results from
the removal of all steps taken by pk%2 from ρ ′p , is legal from Ck−1.
Moreover, RC(Ck−1, ρ ′p ) and RC(Ck−1, ρp ) are indistinguishable to
p(k−1)%2 and cw .
To complete the argument that ρnew is legal from Ck−1, it re-
mains to argue that ρs is legal from RC(Ck−1, ρp ). By definition,
only p(k−1)%2 takes steps in ρs . note that, because RC(Ck−1, ρ ′p )
and RC(Ck−1, ρp ) are indistinguishable to p(k−1)%2, by proving
that ρs is legal from RC(Ck−1, ρ ′p ), it follows that ρs is legal from
RC(Ck−1, ρp ). We next argue that ρs is indeed legal from configura-
tion RC(Ck−1, ρ ′p ). By the definition of αk , if p(k−1)%2 receives any
message from pk%2 in ρs , then the message has been sent before
Ck−1 (i.e., the message has not been sent in ρ). For the base case,
since no message is in transit inC0, the definition of αk implies that
p(k−1)%2 receives no message from pk%2 in ρs . Recall that by defi-
nition of ρ ′s , all messages from cw to p(k−1)%2 are sent by the end
of ρ ′p ). Thus, ρs is legal from RC(Ck−1, ρ ′p ), and since RC(Ck−1, ρ ′p )
and RC(Ck−1, ρp ) are indistinguishable to p(k−1)%2, ρs is also legal
from RC(Ck−1, ρp ). Therefore, ρnew = ρp · ρs is legal from Ck−1.
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From the arguments above, it also follows that RC(Ck−1, ρp ·
ρs ) and Ck = RC(Ck−1, ρ ′p · ρ ′s ) are indistinguishable to p(k−1)%2.
Because RC(Ck−1, ρ ′p ) and RC(Ck−1, ρp ) are indistinguishable to
p(k−1)%2, it follows that RC(Ck−1, ρnew ) and Ck are indistinguish-
able to p(k−1)%2.
We are now ready to formally define δ . To do so, we use exe-
cutions σold (Ck−1,pk%2, ckr ) (Construction 1), σnew (Ck ,pk%2, ckr )
(Construction 2) and ρnew . We also refer to Cnew (Ck ,pk%2, ckr )
(Construction 2). Starting from Ck−1, the adversary applies the
step sequence σold (Ck−1,pk%2, ckr ) ·ρnew ·σnew (Cv ,pk%2, ckr )) (we
later prove that the application of these steps from Ck−1 is legal).
For simplicity, we omit (Ck−1,pk%2, ckr ) and (Cv ,pk%2, ckr ) from the
notations below (thus abusing notations σnew and Cnew which
were also used in the proof of claim 1.) By Construction 1, in the
last step of σold , pk%2 sends a message mo′k%2 to c
k
r . Similarly,
by Construction 2, in the last step of σnew , p(k−1)%2 sends a mes-
sagemn′(k−1)%2 to c
k
r . The adversary next schedules the delivery
ofmo′k%2 andmn
′
(k−1)%2, and lets c
k
r take steps until Tr completes
(this will happen because Tr is a fast transaction). This concludes
the construction of δ .
We now argue that δ is legal. By construction, only processes
ckr and pk%2 take steps in σold . By Observation 1 (claim 2), Ck−1
and RC(Ck−1,σold ) are indistinguishable to cw and p(k−1)%2. Since
only cw and p(k−1)%2 take steps in ρnew , it follows that ρnew is
legal from RC(Ck−1,σold ). Since the processes that take steps
in σold and ρnew are disjoint, then RC(Ck−1,σold · ρnew ) and
RC(Ck−1, ρnew · σold ) are indistinguishable to all processes. Re-
call that RC(Ck−1, ρnew ) and Ck are indistinguishable to p(k−1)%2.
Since σold is a composed of sequence of steps in which only ckr
and pk%2 take steps, RC(Ck ,σold ) and Cnew (Ck ,pk%2, ckr ) are in-
distinguishable to p(k−1)%2. It follows that RC(Ck−1, ρnew · σold )
and Cnew (Cv ,pk%2, ckr ) are indistinguishable to p(k−1)%2. Because
only p(k−1)%2 takes steps in σnew and σnew is legal from Cnew (by
definition), it follows that σnew is legal from RC(Ck−1,σold · ρnew ).
Therefore, δ is legal.
We now focus on the values returned by ckr for Tr in δ . In δ , ckr
executes only transaction Tr . Thus, ckr decides the response for Tr
based solely on the values included inmo′k%2 (sent by pk%2 in σold )
andmn′(k−1)%2 (sent by p(k−1)%2 in σnew ). For the base case,mo
′
k%2
is sent before cw takes any step, somo′k%2 contains neither x0 nor x1.
For the induction step, sincemo′k%2 is sent in σold , by Observation
1 and the one-value messages property, mo′k%2 contains neither
x0 nor x1. Recall thatmn′(k−1)%2 is sent in σnew . By Observation 2
and the one-value messages property,mn′(k−1)%2 contains the value
x(k−1)%2. Recall that (by assumption) ckr does not receive any other
messages from p0 and p1. Thus, ckr receives for Xk%2 just one value,
namely, the same value it receives for it in γold (Construction 1).
Similarly, it receives for X(k−1)%2 just one value, namely, the same
value it receives for it in γnew (Construction 2). It follows that in
δ , the values that ckr returns are x ink%2 for Xk%2 and x(k−1)%2 for
X(k−1)%2. This contradicts Lemma 1. □
3.4 The Limits of the Impossibility Result
Theorem 1 shows that multi-object write transactions (W) are in-
compatible with nonblocking (N), one-roundtrip (O) and one-value
(V) read-only transactions. In this section, we investigate the limits
of our impossibility result. We show that it is sufficient to relax
any of these properties to obtain a distributed storage system that
satisfies the rest. To this end, we describe possible designs that
achieve combinations of three out of the four properties.
N + R + V. This combination supports fast read-only transactions
and is implemented by COPS-SNOW [40]. When a client c writes a
new value x1 of object X1, c piggybacks the information about its
causal dependencies.Before making x1 visible, the server p1 storing
X1 contacts all servers that store objects listed in such dependency
list. For each such object X , p1 collects the identifiers of the read-
only transactions that have read a value of X that is not the last
written. Then p1 enforces that x1 is invisible to these read-only
transactions. This prevents a read-only transaction from reading
x1 and then x0, if in the meanwhile x ′0 has been created such that
x0 <c x ′0 <
c x1. Recall that COPS-SNOW does not ensure the W
property, i.e., it does not support multi-object write transactions.
N+V +W. This design is implemented byWren [54]. In this system,
the servers periodically exchange information about the minimum
timestamp among those of complete transactions. This cutoff times-
tamp is such that there does not exist any non-complete (or future)
transaction with a lower timestamp. The cutoff timestamp is used
to identify a snapshot of the data storage system from which a read-
only transaction can read without blocking. A new object written
by a client is assigned a timestamp higher than the cutoff timestamp,
so as to reflect the causal dependencies of the object. Therefore,
each client caches locally the values of the objects it writes, as long
as their timestamps are smaller than the cutoff. This mechanism
allows a client to read its own writes that are not included yet in the
snapshot identified by the cutoff timestamp. Thus, each read-only
transaction undergoes a first round of communication to get in-
formed about the cutoff timestamp (we remark that this timestamp
can be provided by any server) and then executes a second round
of communication to actually read the objects.
N + R + W. Although we are not aware of any system that imple-
ments this design, we briefly discuss a modification of the COPS
system [38] to achieve this combination of properties. COPS does
not implement multi-object write transactions and implements
read-only transactions that are nonblocking but may require two
rounds of communication, each communicating just one value of
the object to be read. We can augment COPS to achieve R and W
as follows. Each write operation within a transaction must carry a)
the values of the other objects written in the same transaction and
b) information about all objects on which the transaction causally
depends (including their values). This additional meta-data is stored
with each written object. Hence, c executes a read-only transaction
as follows. First, for each object o to read, c retrieves the value
of o and the additional meta-data from the corresponding server.
Then, once c has received a reply from each involved partition, c
identifies, for each object, the last written value, which is returned
to the application. This protocol is not efficient, as it requires to
store and communicate a prohibitively big amount of data. It is an
open problem whether a more efficient N+R+W protocol exists.
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System Fast ROT WTX ConsistencyR V N
RAMP [12] ≤ 2 ≤ 2 yes yes Read Atomicity [12]
COPS [38] ≤ 2 ≤ 2 yes no Causal Consistency [2]
Orbe [24] 2 1 no no Causal Consistency
GentleRain [25] 2 1 no no Causal Consistency
ChainReaction [4] ≥ 1 ≥ 1 no no Causal Consistency
POCC [31] 2 1 no no Causal Consistency
Contrarian [22] 2 1 yes no Causal Consistency
COPS-SNOW [40] 1 1 yes no Causal Consistency
Eiger [39] ≤ 3 ≤ 2 yes yes Causal Consistency
Wren [54] 2 1 yes yes Causal Consistency
SwiftCloud† [61] 1 1 yes yes Causal Consistency
Cure [3] 2 1 no yes Causal Consistency
Yesquel [1] 1 1 no yes Snapshot Isolation [14]
Occult [42] ≥ 1 ≥ 1 yes yes Per Client Parallel SI [42]
Granola [20] 2 1 yes yes Serializability [15]
TAPIR [62] ≤ 2 1 yes yes Serializability
Eiger-PS† [40] 1 1 yes yes PO-Serializability [40]
Spanner† [19] 1 1 no yes Strict Serializability [48]
DrTM [59] ≥ 1 ≥ 1 no yes Strict Serializability
RoCoCo [43] ≥ 1 ≥ 1 no yes Strict Serializability
RoCoCo-SNOW [40] 1 1 no yes Strict Serializability
Calvin [57] 2 1 no yes Strict Serializability
Table 1: Characterization of existing systems. Systems with
a † rely on a different systemmodel from the one we target.
R + V + W. This design is implemented by RoCoCo-SNOW [40]
and Spanner [19], which achieve strict serializability, and hence
satisfy causal consistency. RoCoCo-SNOW implements a mecha-
nism similar to COPS-SNOW, but assumes the a priori knowledge
of the data accessed by transactions, which are executed as stored
procedures. Spanner assumes tightly synchronized physical clocks
and leverages the known bound on clock drift to order transactions.
It is an open problem whether a R + V + W implementation exists
that does not rely on such assumptions.
4 RELATEDWORK
Existing systems. Table 1 characterizes existing systems from the
point of view of the sub-properties of fast read-only transactions
that they achieve, their support for multi-object write transactions,
and their target consistency level. Consistently with our theorem,
none among the systems that target the system model described
in Section 2 implements multi-object write transactions and fast
read-only transactions. Several systems achieve three out of the
four properties we consider, and COPS-SNOW is the only one that
implements fast read-only-transactions while complying with our
systemmodel. Our theorem implies that the design of these systems
cannot be improved with respect to the properties we consider.
SwiftCloud and Eiger-PS implement fast read-only transactions
and support multi-object write transactions, but assume a system
model that differs from the one we target. Although they eventually
complete all writes, the values they write may be invisible to some
clients for an indefinitely long time. Hence, read-only transactions
may see very old values of some objects, even the initial ones.
To improve the freshness of the data seen by the clients, servers
can communicate with clients out of the scope of transactional
operations. This requires that the servers maintain a view of the
connected clients. Typically, there are far more clients than servers,
so this design choice results in reduced performance and scalability
and is avoided by state-of-the-art data platforms. Furthermore,
SwiftCloud assumes only a single partition that stores the whole
data set (potentially fully replicated across multiple sites).
Impossibility results. Existing impossibility results on storage
systems typically rely on stronger consistency or progress proper-
ties. Brewer [16] conjectured the CAP theorem, according to which
no implementation guarantees consistency, availability, and network
partition tolerance. Gilbert and Lynch [27] formalized and proved
this conjecture. Specifically, they formalized consistency by using
the notion of atomic objects [33] (i.e., by assuming linearizability
[28], which is stronger than causal consistency). Roohitavaf et al.
[52] considered a replicated storage system implemented using data
centers (i.e., clusters of servers), and a model in which any value
written is immediately visible to the reads initiated in the same
data center. They proved that it is impossible to ensure causal con-
sistency, availability and network partition tolerance across data
centers. Their proof (as well as the proof of the CAP Theorem) rely
on message losses, whereas in our model no message can be lost.
Mahajan et al. [49] proved that no implementation guarantees
one-way convergence (a progress condition stating that if pro-
cesses communicate appropriately, then they eventually converge
on the values they read for objects), availability, and any consis-
tency stronger than real time causal consistency [49] assuming
that messages may be lost. In their model, communication may
occur among any pair of processes. On the contrary, in our model,
communication cannot occur directly between clients, the progress
property we assume is simpler (and decoupled from the underlying
communication), and no message may be lost.
Variants of causal consistency motivated by replicated systems
have been presented in [8, 60]. Their definitions are based on the
events that are executed at the servers (and not on the histories
of operations executed in the transactions issued by the clients).
Attiya et al. [8] proved that a (non-transactional) replicated storage
system implementingmulti-valued registers (i.e., registers for which
a read returns the set of values written by conflicting writes) cannot
satisfy any consistency strictly stronger than observable causal
consistency. Xiang and Vaidya [60] defined the notion of replica-
centric causal consistency, and they proved that (non-transactional)
replicated distributed storage systems ensuring this consistency
property have to track writes. These works are in different avenues
than our work and focus on other models than that in our paper.
Lu et al. [40] proved the SNOW theorem, which shows that no
fully-functional distributed transactional system can support fast
strictly serializable read-only transactions. Lu et al. also showed that
any fully-functional distributed transactional system that achieves
a consistency level weaker than or equal to process-ordered se-
rializability [40] (and hence causal consistency) can support fast
read-only transactions. Tomsic et al. [58] further showed that im-
plementing fast read-only transactions with an order-preserving
consistency level (as is the case for causal consistency) is possi-
ble only by allowing read-only transactions to read possibly stale
values of the objects being accessed. These results may seem at
odds with our impossibility result. However, these results rest on
very weak assumptions on the progress guarantees of write opera-
tions. Although they assume that all writes eventually complete,
the values they write may be invisible to clients for an indefinitely
long time. Such a weak assumption allows the design of trivial
algorithms in which read-only transactions can return arbitrarily
old values –even the initial ones– for the objects they read.
Recently, Didona et. al [22] showed a lower bound on the number
of bits that must be communicated in order to support fast causally
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consistent read-only transactions in distributed storage systems. On
the contrary, this paper focuses on the design implications of fast
read transactions in distributed transactional such systems, showing
that they are incompatible with multi-object write transactions.
Since the introduction of causal consistency by Ahamad et al.
[2] for a shared memory system, other versions of causal consis-
tency has been studied [38, 51]. Our result holds if we replace our
definition of causal consistency with those provided in these papers.
5 CONCLUSION
We present an impossibility result that establishes a fundamental
trade-off in the design of distributed transactional storage systems:
fast read transactions cannot be achieved by fully-functional trans-
actional storage systems. The design of such systems must either
sacrifice fast read transactions, or must settle for reduced function-
ality, i.e., support only single-object write transactions.
Unlike most previous work on distributed transactional systems,
which target strong consistency, our result assumes only causal
consistency. This broadens the scope of our result which applies
also to systems that implement any consistency level stronger than
causal consistency, or a hybrid consistency level that includes causal
consistency. Proving our result under such weak consistency model
is nontrivial and required us to devise a complex proof.
Our result sheds light on the design choices of state-of-the-art
distributed transactional storage systems, and is useful for the ar-
chitects of such systems because it identifies impossible designs.
Our result also opens several interesting research questions,
such as investigating which is the weakest consistency condition
for which our impossibility result holds. In addition, it is interesting
to further investigate the design of systems that provide some of the
combinations of the studied properties, as discussed in Section 3.4.
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A THE GENERAL IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT
We prove our impossibility result i.e., if a causally consistent imple-
mentation of a transactional storage system supports write-only
transactions that write to more than one object, then it cannot
also provide fast read-only transactions for the general case, where
the system has any number of servers and the system is partially
replicated. By partial replication, we mean that each server stores a
different set of objects but these sets are not disjoint. In addition, no
server stores all objects; i.e., for any server, there is an object such
that the server does not store it. To access an object, the algorithm
is allowed to access all servers that store the object. In this case, we
need to revisit our definition of a fast read-only transaction.
Definition 5 (General fast read-only transaction). We say that an
implementation of a distributed storage system supports fast read-
only transactions, if in each execution α it produces, the following
hold for every read-only transaction executed in α :
(1) Non-blocking and One-Roundtrip Property. Same as in
Definition 4;
(2) General one-value messages. (a) Each message sent from
a server to a client does not contain any value that has been
written by some write transaction in α to an object X if X
is not stored on the server; (b) Let ΣX be the set of servers
which store an object X . For each object X read by a client,
only one server in ΣX sends a message to the client and the
message contains only one value that has been written by
some write transaction in α to X .
Theorem 2. No causally consistent implementation of a trans-
actional storage system that supports transactions which can con-
currently read and write multiple objects, provides fast read-only
transactions.
(The claim of Theorem 2 remains the same as that of Theorem
1. The only difference is that we now assume a partially replicated
system.)
The proof is by contradiction. Assume that there exists a causally
consistent implementation Π which supports concurrent read-write
transactions that access multiple objects and provides fast read-only
transactions. We construct an infinite execution α which contains
just a write-only transaction Tw , invoked by some client cw , and
we show that the values written by Tw never become visible.
Let N + 1 be the number of objects stored in the system. For
convenience, every execution we consider in this paper, starts with
the execution of N + 1 initial transactions, starting from Qin . Each
transaction is denoted by T ini (invoked by c
in
i ) that writes some
initial value x ini in Xi . We denote byQE0 a reachable configuration
in which all values x in0 ,x
in
1 , . . . ,x
in
N are visible and all buffers are
empty.5 We also revisit the definition of value visibility to exclude
from later executions, these clients cin0 , c
in
1 , . . . , c
in
N whose sole
purpose is to initialize values for each object.
Definition 6 (General value visibility). Consider any object X
and let C be any reachable configuration which is either quiescent
or just a write-only transaction (by a client cw ) writing a value
5If such reachable configuration does not exist, it is already shown that for
x in0 , x
in
1 , . . . , x
in
N to be visible, there are always messages in buffers, which contra-
dicts the progress condition.
x into X is active in C . Value x is visible in C , if and only if the
following holds: in every legal execution starting from C which
contains just a read-only transaction Tr (invoked by any client
c < {cw , cin0 , cin1 , . . . , cinN }) that reads X , x is returned as the value
of X for Tr .
For convenience, every execution we construct hereafter, starts
with the execution of a read-only transactionT inr = (r (X0)∗, r (X1)∗,
. . . , r (XN )∗) by a client cw , cw < {cin0 , cin1 , . . . , cinN } (starting from
QE0). SinceT inr is a fast read-only transaction,T inr completes; since
x in0 ,x
in
1 , . . . ,x
in
N are visible in QE0, cw returns (x in0 ,x in1 , . . . ,x inN )
for T inr . We denote by CE0 a reachable configuration starting from
the configuration in which T inr completes, in which all buffers are
empty (i.e., no message is in transit).
For every reachable configuration C (starting from CE0) and
every legal execution γ from C , we denote by RC(C,γ ) the configu-
ration that results from the execution of γ starting from C . Given
two executions γ1 and γ2, we denote by γ1 · γ2 the concatenation of
γ1 with γ2, i.e., γ1 · γ2 is an execution consisting of all events of γ1
followed by all events of γ2 (in order).
A.1 Preliminary Observations and Lemmas
We start with some useful observations. The first is an immediate
consequence of the fact that Π ensures causal consistency.
Observation 3. Let γ be any legal execution of Π starting from
CE0 which contains two transactions: client cw invokes a write-only
transaction Tw = (w(X0)x0,w(X1)x1, . . . ,w(XN )xN ), and a differ-
ent client cr invokes a read-only transactionTr = (r (X0)∗, r (X1)∗, . . . ,
r (XN )∗) which completes in γ . Let vi be the value which cr re-
turns forTr , i.e.,Tr = (r (X0)v0, r (X1)v1, . . . , r (XN )vN ). Then, either
vi = xi ,∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,N }, or vi = x ini ∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,N }.
Observation 4. Let τ be any arbitrary legal execution starting
from CE0 which contains just one transaction: client cw executes a
write-only transaction Tw = (w(X0)x0,w(X1)x1, . . . ,w(XN )xN (i.e.,
cw and the servers take steps to execute Tw ). Let C be any reachable
configuration when τ is applied from CE0. If ∃i,xi is not visible in
C , then there exists at least one client cr < {cw , cin0 , cin1 , . . . , cinN }
such that if, starting fromC , cr executes a read-only transactionTr =
(r (X0)∗, r (X1)∗, . . . , r (XN )∗), then cr returns (x in0 ,x in1 , . . . ,x inN ) for
Tr .
Proof. To derive a contradiction, assume that for any client
cr < {cw , cin0 , cin1 , . . . , cinN } cr invokes Tr and cr does not return
(x in0 ,x in1 , . . . ,x inN ). Notice that by convention, as τ starts fromCE0,
vi = ⊥ for any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,N } is not an option. (Notice also that
since Π ensures that read-only transactions are fast, Tr completes.)
Then by Observation 3, cr returns (x0,x1, . . . ,xN ). Since cr is cho-
sen to be an arbitrary client not in {cw , cin0 , cin1 , . . . , cinN }, Definition
6 implies that atC , xi ,∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,N } is visible. This contradicts
the hypothesis that at least one of the values is not visible. □
Notice that if C = CE0, then Observation 4 holds for all clients
not in {cw , cin0 , cin1 , . . . , cinN }.
In the rest of the proof, we will repeatedly employ the two execu-
tions we present in Constructions 3 and 4 (each time using different
parameters for the construction).
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Symbol Meaning Used in
Xi object i System model and proofs
x ini Initial, old value of object xi System model and proofs
pi Server that stores xi System model and proofs
T ini Transaction that writes x
in
i System model and proofs
c ini Client that performs T
in
i System model and proofs
cw
Client that reads x in0 and x
in
1 and then performs
a write transaction that writes new values x0 , x1
System model and proofs
T inr Read-only transaction issued by cw to read X0 , X1 System model and proofs
Tw Write-only transaction issued by cw that writes new values for X0 , X1 All proofs
xi New value of Xi , written by Tw All proofs
cr Client that invokes Tr to read X0 , Y0 System model and proofs
mji j-th message sent by pi System model and proofs
Qin Initial configuration Proof of Lemma 1 (See Figure 1)
Q0 Configuration in which x in0 , x
in
1 become visible Proof of Lemma 1(See Figure 1)
C0 Configuration in which T inr has returned x in0 , x
in
1 to cw . Proof of Lemma 1(See Figure 1)
Tr Read-only transaction issued by cr All proofs
γold Execution in which cr reads x in0 , x
in
1
Construction 1 (See Figure 2),
Proof of Lemma 3
γnew Execution in which cr reads x0 , x1
Construction 2 (See Figure 2)
Proof of Lemma 3
γ Contradictory execution in which cr reads a mix of old and new values for X0 , X1 .γ results from the mix of sub-executions of γold and γnew
Proof of claim 1 of Lemma 3 (see Figure 3)
β Sub-sequence of γ Proof of claim 1 of Lemma 3 (see Figure 3)
σold Sub-execution of γold that leads cr to read x in0
Construction 1 (see Figure 2),
Proof of claim 1 and 2 of Lemma 3
σnew Sub-execution of γnew that leads Tr of cr to read new values
Construction 1 (see Figure 2),
Proof of claim 1 and 2 of Lemma 3
βnew Sequence of steps that brings the system to a configuration in which x0 , x1 are visible Proof of claim 1 and 2 of Lemma 3 (see Figure 3)
δ Contradictory execution in which cr reads a mix of old and new values for X0 , X1 .δ results from the mix of sub-executions of γold and γnew
Proof of claim 2 of Lemma 3
ρ Subsequence of δ (similar to β ) Proof of claim 2 of Lemma 3
α Infinite execution that contains just one write-only transaction Twand such that the values written by Tw never become visible
Proof of Lemma 3
αk Prefix of α Proof of Lemma 3
Table 2: Table of symbols.
Construction 3 (Construction of execution γold (C,p, cr ) and exe-
cutionσold (C,p, cr )). Let τ be any arbitrary legal execution starting
from CE0 which contains just one transaction: client cw executes
a write-only transaction Tw = (w(X0)x0,w(X1)x1, . . . ,w(XN )xN ).
take steps to execute Tw ). Fix any server p. For every reachable
configuration C when τ is applied from CE0 in which the follow-
ing holds: no value other than x ini is visible for Xi for at least one
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,N }, and for every client cr that satisfies Observa-
tion 4, we define executionγold (C,p, cr ) as follows. Inγold (C,p, cr ),
first cr invokes Tr starting from C . So, cr takes steps and since it
reads all objects, cr sends a messagemoq (C,p, cr ) to every server
q. Next, moq (C,p, cr ) is delivered for every server q,q , p and
then each server q,q , p takes a step and receives moq (C,p, cr ).
Since Tr is a fast transaction, once q receivesmoq (C,p, cr ), either
q sends a responsemo′q (C,p, cr ) to cr within the same step, or q
does not. Denote by σold (C,p, cr ) this sequence of steps starting
from C to the step in which every server q,q , p has taken a step
and sent the response (if q sends it). Next, we let the remaining
message, i.e., mop (C,p, cr ), be delivered, and let p take a step to
receivemop (C,p, cr ). By one-roundtrip property, once p receives
mop (C,p, cr ), either p sends a response to cr within the same step,
or p does not. Finally, we let cr take steps, receive the responses
from p and every server q,q , p (if they send a response), complete
Tr , and return a response for it.
By the way γold (C,p, cr ) is constructed and by Observation 4,
we get the following.
Observation 5. The following claims hold:
(1) Execution γold (C,p, cr ) is legal from C , and
(2) The return value for Tr in γold (C,p, cr ) is (x in0 ,x in1 , . . . ,x inN ).
Construction 4 (Construction of execution γnew (C,p, cr ) and exe-
cution σnew (C,p, cr )). Let τ be any arbitrary legal execution start-
ing fromCE0 which contains just one transaction: client cw executes
a write-only transaction Tw = (w(X0)x0,w(X1)x1, . . . ,w(XN )xN ).
Fix any serverp and let cr be any client not in {cw , cin0 , cin1 , . . . , cinN }.
For every reachable configuration C when τ is applied from CE0,
in which xi is visible for Xi for at least one i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,N }, we
define execution γnew (C,p, cr ) as follows. In γnew , starting fromC ,
cr invokesTr and takes steps until it sends a messagemnq (C,p, cr )
to every server q. Let Cnew (C,p, cr ) be the resulting configuration.
Next, we let mnp (C,p, cr ) be delivered. Then, p takes a step and
receivesmnp (C,p, cr ). SinceTr is a fast transaction, once p receives
mnp (C,p, cr ), either p sends a responsemn′p (C,p, cr ) to cr within
the same step, or p does not. This sequence of steps starting from
Cnew (C,p, cr ) to the step which p takes (inclusive) is denoted by
σnew (C,p, cr ). Next, we letmnq (C,p, cr ) be delivered for any server
q,q , p, and let each q take a step to receivemnq (C,p, cr ); once
q receives mnq (C,p, cr ), either q sends a response mn′q (C,p, cr )
to cr within the same step, or q does not. Finally, we let cr take
steps. Since Tr is a fast transaction, once cr receives the responses
from p and every server q,q , p (if they send a response to cr ), Tr
completes and cr returns a response for Tr .
By the way γnew (C,p, cr ) is constructed and by Definition 6, we
get the following.
Observation 6. The following claims hold for γnew (C,p, cr ):
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(1) Execution γnew (C,p, cr ) is legal from C , and
(2) The return value for Tr in γnew (C,p, cr ) is (x0,x1, . . . ,xN ).
We are now ready to construct an execution α1 (that will be a
prefix of α ) in which for at least one server q, q sends at least one
message.
Lemma 4. In any arbitrary legal execution starting fromCE0 which
contains just one transaction: client cw executes a write-only trans-
action Tw = (w(X0)x0,w(X1)x1, . . . ,w(XN )xN ), it holds that for at
least one server q in the system, at least one of the following two
happens:
• q sends a message to a server other than q (i.e., q sends an
explicit message to a server);
• q sends a message to cw so that after cw receives this message,
cw sends a message to a server other than q (i.e., q sends an
implicit message to a server).
Proof. To derive a contradiction, assume that for every server
q in the system, the following hold:
• q sends no message to any other server;
• q sends no message to cw so that after cw receives the mes-
sage, cw sends a message to a server other than q.
To derive a contradiction, we will construct an execution γ ,
where in addition to transaction Tw , a read-only transaction Tr =
(r (X0)∗, r (X1)∗, . . . , r (XN )∗) is invoked by a client cr not in {cw , cin0 ,
cin1 , . . . , c
in
N } andTr completes inγ . We will show thatγ contradicts
Observation 3.
To construct γ , we first define an execution β and some subse-
quences of it, and we study their properties. Starting from CE0,
cw invokes Tw and executes solo (i.e., only cw and all servers take
steps) until xi is visible for any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,N } (minimal progress
for write-only transactions implies that there is a configuration
in which xi is indeed visible for any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,N }). Let Cv be
the first configuration where xi is visible for any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,N }.
Let β be the sequence of steps which are taken from CE0 to Cv .
For any server p, consider execution γnew (Cv ,p, cr ). Because in
γnew (Cv ,p, cr ), starting from Cv , only the messages sent by cw
are delivered before cr takes the steps to complete Tr , thus to any
server p, γnew (Cv ,p, cr ) and γnew (Cv , s, cr ) are indistinguishable
for any server s, s , p. Thus when cr takes the steps to complete
Tr , cr receives the same set of responses in γnew (Cv ,p, cr ) for any
server p. In order to exclude empty and garbage responses, letM
be the smallest set of non-empty responses where each response
contains a value that has been written by some write transaction.
As the system is partially replicated, the size of M is at least two.
W.l.o.g., we fix any server p which sends a response included inM
and thus fix execution γnew (Cv ,p, cr ). Then, Observation 6 implies
that the response for Tr in γnew (Cv ,p, cr ) is (x0,x1, . . . ,xN ). For
simplicity, we omit (Cv ,p, cr ) from the notation in the rest of the
proof of this lemma.
Recall that β is the sequence of steps which are taken from CE0
toCv . Let β ′p be the shortest prefix of β which contains all messages
sent by cw to p. Let βp be the subsequence of β ′p in which all steps
taken by any server q,q , p have been removed. Let β ′s be the
suffix of β after β ′p . Let βs be the subsequence of β ′s containing
only steps by p. Let βnew be βp · βs . We now argue that βnew is
legal from CE0. Because β ′p is a prefix of β , β ′p is legal from CE0.
By assumption, p does not receive any message from any server
q,q , p in β ′p . Moreover, any server q,q , p sends no message
to cw so that after cw receives the message, q sends a message to
p. By definition, β ′p ends with a message sent by cw to p (if it is
not empty). It follows that cw does not receive any message from
q in β ′p . Thus, βp is legal from CE0. Moreover, RC(CE0, β ′p ) and
RC(CE0, βp ) are indistinguishable to p and cw .
We next argue that βs is legal fromRC(CE0, β ′p ). We notice that in
βs , only p takes steps. Then because RC(CE0, β ′p ) and RC(CE0, βp )
are indistinguishable top, by arguing that βs is legal fromRC(CE0, β ′p ),
we also argue that βs is legal from RC(CE0, βp ). Below we ar-
gue that βs is indeed legal from RC(CE0, β ′p ). By assumption, any
server q,q , p does not send any message to p in β , so p does
not receive any message from any server q,q , p in βs . By def-
inition of β ′s , cw does not send any message to p in β ′s , (because
all messages from cw to p are sent in β ′p ), so any message p re-
ceives from cw in βs has been sent in β ′p . Thus βs is legal from
RC(CE0, β ′p ), and βs is legal from RC(CE0, βp ). Moreover, by argu-
ing that βs is legal fromRC(CE0, β ′p ), we also show thatRC(CE0, β ′p ·
βs ) and Cv = RC(CE0, β ′p · β ′s ) are indistinguishable to p. Because
RC(CE0, β ′p ) and RC(CE0, βp ) are indistinguishable to p, it follows
that RC(CE0, βnew ) and Cv are indistinguishable to p.
To construct γ , we have to utilize executions σold (CE0,p, cr )
and σnew (Cv ,p, cr ) and refer to configurationCnew (Cv ,p, cr ). (For
simplicity, we omit (CE0,p, cr ) and (Cv ,p, cr ) from the notations be-
low.) Specifically, starting fromCE0, σold is first applied. Recall that
for any server q,q , p, in its last step of σold , q sends at most one
messagemo′q to cr . Since CE0 and RC(CE0,σold ) are indistinguish-
able to cw and p, and since only cw and p take steps in βnew , βnew
is legal from RC(CE0,σold ). So, to construct γ , βnew is applied from
RC(CE0,σold ). The resulting configuration is RC(CE0,σold · βnew ).
Since the processes which take steps in σold and βnew are dis-
joint, then RC(CE0,σold · βnew ) and RC(CE0, βnew · σold ) are in-
distinguishable. Recall that to p, RC(CE0, βnew ) and Cv are in-
distinguishable. Therefore, to p, RC(CE0, βnew · σold ) and Cnew
are indistinguishable. Because only p takes steps in σnew , σnew
is therefore legal from RC(CE0, βnew · σold ) and also legal from
RC(CE0,σold ·βnew ). We apply it from RC(CE0,σold ·βnew ). Recall
that in the last step of σnew , p sends a messagemn′p to cr . Finally,
mo′q for any server q,q , p (if q sends a response) and mn′p are
delivered in γ , and next, cr takes steps. SinceTr is a fast transaction,
Tr completes. This concludes the construction of γ .
In γ , cr executes only transaction Tr . Thus, cr decides the re-
sponse for Tr based solely on the values included inmo′q for any
server q,q , p (if q sends a response) and mn′p . Since mo′q for
any server q,q , p is sent before cw takes steps, mo′q contains
no value in {x0,x1, . . . ,xN }. Recall thatmn′p is sent in γnew . By
the one-value messages property, mn′p contains only values in
{x0,x1, . . . ,xN }. As the system is partially replicated,mn′p cannot
contain all values in {x0,x1, . . . ,xN }. It follows that inγ , the return
value of cr forTr can be neither (x0,x1, . . . ,xN ) nor (x in0 ,x in1 , . . . ,x inN ).
This contradicts Observation 3. □
By Lemma 4, we have that for at least one server q in the sys-
tem, at least one of the following two happens in any arbitrary
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legal execution starting from CE0 which contains just one transac-
tion Tw = (w(X0)x0,w(X1)x1, . . . ,w(XN )xN ) executed by cw : (1)
q sends a message to a server other than q; (2) q sends a message
to cw so that: after cw receives this message, cw sends a message
to a server other than q. Letm1 be the first message that satisfies
any of the two claims above.
We are now ready to construct execution α1. In α1, Tw executes
solo starting from CE0 untilm1 is sent. We denote by C1 the con-
figuration that results when α1 is applied from CE0.
Lemma 5. At C1, x0,x1, . . . ,xN are not visible.
Proof. Assume that atC1,xi is visible for some i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,N }.
To derive a contradiction, we will construct an execution γ where
in addition toTw , a read-only transactionTr = (r (X0)∗, r (X1)∗, . . . ,
r (XN )∗) is invoked by a client cr < {cw , cin0 , cin1 , . . . , cinN }, and cr
returns from Tr . We will show that γ contradicts Observation 3.
We fix the server p in a similar way as in the proof of Lemma
4 given execution γnew (C1, s, cr ) for every server s . Then we con-
struct γ by utilizing γold (CE0,p, cr ) and γnew (C1,p, cr ). By Obser-
vation 5, cr returns (x in0 ,x in1 , . . . ,x inN ) for Tr in γold (CE0,p, cr ).
Because by assumption, xi is visible at C1, Observation 6 implies
that cr returns (x0,x1, . . . ,xN ) for Tr in γnew (C1,p, cr ).
To construct γ , we first define an execution β and some subse-
quences of it, and we study their properties. Let β be the sequence
of steps which are taken from CE0 to C1. Let β ′p be the shortest
prefix of β which contains all messages sent by cw to p. Let βp
be the subsequence of β ′p in which all steps taken by any server
q,q , p have been removed. Let β ′s be the suffix of β after β ′p . Let
βs be the subsequence of β ′s containing only steps by p. Let βnew
be βp · βs . We now argue that βnew is legal from CE0. Because β ′p
is a prefix of β , β ′p is legal from CE0. By the definition of α1, p does
not receive any message from any server q,q , p in β ′p . Moreover,
becausem1 is the first message sent by some server (implicitly or
explicitly), cw receives no message from any server q,q , p such
that after the receipt of this message, cw sends a message to p. By
definition, β ′p ends with a message sent by cw top (if it is not empty).
It follows that cw does not receive any message from any server
q,q , p in β ′p . Thus, βp is legal from CE0. Moreover, RC(CE0, β ′p )
and RC(CE0, βp ) are indistinguishable to p and cw .
We next argue that βs is legal fromRC(CE0, β ′p ). We notice that in
βs , only p takes steps. Then because RC(CE0, β ′p ) and RC(CE0, βp )
are indistinguishable top, by arguing that βs is legal fromRC(CE0, β ′p ),
we also argue that βs is legal from RC(CE0, βp ). Below we argue
that βs is indeed legal from RC(CE0, β ′p ). By the definition of α1,
p does not receive any message from any server q,q , p in β .
By definition of β ′s , cw does not send any message to p in β ′s ,
(because all messages from cw to p are sent in β ′p ), so any mes-
sage p receives from cw in βs has been sent in β ′p . Thus βs is le-
gal from RC(CE0, β ′p ), and βs is legal from RC(CE0, βp ). Moreover,
by arguing that βs is legal from RC(CE0, β ′p ), we also show that
RC(CE0, β ′p · βs ) andC1 = RC(CE0, β ′p · β ′s ) are indistinguishable to
p. Because RC(CE0, β ′p ) and RC(CE0, βp ) are indistinguishable to p,
it follows that RC(CE0, βnew ) and C1 are indistinguishable to p.
Nowwe are ready to constructγ using executionsσold (CE0,p, cr ),
σnew (C1,p, cr ) and βnew and referring to configurationCnew (C1,p,
cr ). (For simplicity, we omit (CE0,p, cr ) and (C1,p, cr ) from the no-
tations below.) Starting from CE0, σold is first applied. Recall that
for any server q,q , p, in its last step of σold , q sends at most
one messagemo′q to cr . Since CE0 and RC(CE0,σold ) are indistin-
guishable to cw and p, and since only cw and p take steps in βnew ,
βnew is legal from RC(CE0,σold ). The resulting configuration is
RC(CE0,σold · βnew ). Since the processes which take steps in σold
and βnew are disjoint, thenRC(CE0,σold ·βnew ) andRC(CE0, βnew ·
σold ) are indistinguishable. Recall that to p, RC(CE0, βnew ) and C1
are indistinguishable. Therefore, to p, RC(C0, βnew ·σold ) andCnew
are indistinguishable. Because only p takes steps in σnew , σnew
is therefore legal from RC(CE0, βnew · σold ) and also legal from
RC(CE0,σold ·βnew ). We apply it from RC(CE0,σold ·βnew ). Recall
that in the last step of σnew , p sends messagemn′p to cr . Finally,
mo′q for any server q,q , p (if q sends a response) and mn′p are
delivered in γ , and next, cr takes steps. SinceTr is a fast transaction,
Tr completes. This concludes the construction of γ .
In γ , cr executes only transaction Tr . Thus, cr decides the re-
sponse for Tr based solely on the values included inmo′q for any
server q,q , p andmn′p . Sincemo′q for any server q,q , p is sent
before cw takes steps,mo′q contains no value in {x0,x1, . . . ,xN }.
Recall thatmn′p is sent inγnew . By the one-value messages property,
mn′p contains only values in {x0,x1, . . . ,xN }. As the system is par-
tially replicated,mn′p cannot contain all values in {x0,x1, . . . ,xN }.
It follows that in γ , the return value of cr for Tr can be neither
(x0,x1, . . . ,xN ) nor (x in0 ,x in1 , . . . ,x inN ). This contradicts Observa-
tion 3. □
A.2 The Infinite Execution
We now continue to prove that α is infinite. We do so by proving
that there is an infinite sequence of executions α1,α2, . . . such that,
all of them are distinct prefixes of α . Let α0 be an empty execution.
Lemma 6. For any integer k ≥ 1, there exists an execution αk , legal
fromCE0, in which only one transactionTw = (w(X0)x0,w(X1)x1, . . . ,
w(XN )xN ) is executed by client cw . Let Ck be the configuration that
results when αk is applied from CE0. Then, the following hold:
(1) αk = αk−1 · α ′k , where in α ′k , for at least one server q in the
system, at least one of the following occurs:
• a message is sent by q to a server other than q, or
• a message is sent by q to cw so that after cw receives this
message, cw sends a message to a server other than q.
(2) In Ck , x0,x1, . . . ,xN are not visible.
Proof of Lemma 6. By induction on k . For the base case (k = 1),
let α0 be the empty execution and α ′1 = α1. Then, Lemma 4 implies
that claim 1 holds. Moreover, Lemma 5 implies that claim 2 holds.
For the induction hypothesis, fix any integer k ≥ 2 and assume
that the claim holds for any integer j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1. We prove that
the claim holds for k .
The proof of claim 1 follows similar arguments as those in the
proof of Lemma 4. We assume that the claim does not hold. We
construct an execution γ and show that γ contradicts Observation
3. By the induction hypothesis (claim 2), x0,x1, . . . ,xN are not
visible in Ck−1. By Observation 4, there exists some client ckr not
in {cw , cin0 , cin1 , . . . , cinN } such that if, starting fromCk−1, ckr invokes
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Tr = (r (X0)∗, r (X1)∗, . . . , r (XN )∗), then ckr returns (x in0 ,x in1 , . . . ,x inN ).
The construction of γ utilizes execution σold ( Ck−1,p, ckr ) in a way
similar that σold (C0,p, cr ) has been utilized in the construction of γ
in Lemma 4. Starting from Ck−1, cw and all servers take steps until
x0,x1, . . . ,xN are visible. We then define configuration Cv , and
executions β and βnew in a way similar to that defined in the proof
of Lemma 4 (but with Ck−1 playing the role of CE0). We finally
define γ based on σold (Ck−1,p, ckr ), σnew (Cv ,p, ckr ) and βnew , and
we argue that in γ , ckr returns a response for Tr that contradicts
Observation 3.
We continue with the details of the proof. To derive a contradic-
tion, assume that we let cw and all servers take steps starting from
Ck−1 and the following holds: for every server q,
• q sends no message to a server other than q;
• q sends no message to cw so that after cw receives the mes-
sage, cw sends a message to a server other than q.
In other words, α ′k cannot be defined.
To derive a contradiction, we will construct an executionγ where
in addition toTw , a read-only transactionTr = (r (X0)∗, r (X1)∗, . . . ,
r (XN )∗) is invoked by a client ckr not in {cw , cin0 , cin1 , . . . , cinN } and
ckr returns from Tr . We will show that γ contradicts Observation 3.
To construct γ , we first define an execution β and some subse-
quences of it, and we study their properties. Starting from Ck−1,
cw invokes Tw and executes solo (i.e., only cw and servers take
steps) until x0,x1, . . . ,xN are visible (minimal progress for write-
only transactions implies that there is a configuration in which
x0,x1, . . . ,xN are indeed visible). Let Cv be the first configuration
where x0,x1, . . . ,xN are visible. Let β be the sequence of steps
which are taken from Ck−1 to Cv . For any server p, consider ex-
ecution γnew (Cv ,p, ckr ). Because in γnew (Cv ,p, ckr ), starting from
Cv , only the messages sent by cw are delivered before ckr takes
the steps to complete Tr , thus to any server p, γnew (Cv ,p, ckr ) and
γnew (Cv , s, ckr ) for any server s, s , p are indistinguishable. Thus
when ckr takes the steps to complete Tr , ckr receives the same set of
responses in γnew (Cv ,p, ckr ) for any server p. In order to exclude
empty and garbage responses, let M be the smallest set of non-
empty responses where each response contains a value that has
been written by some write transaction. As the system is partially
replicated, the size ofM is at least two. W.l.o.g., we fix any server
p which sends a response included in M and thus fix execution
γnew (Cv ,p, ckr ). Then, Observation 6 implies that the response for
Tr in γnew (Cv ,p, ckr ) is (x0,x1, . . . ,xN ). For simplicity, we omit
(Cv ,p, ckr ) from the notation in the rest of the proof of this lemma.
Let β ′p be the shortest prefix of β which contains all messages
sent by cw to p. Let βp be the subsequence of β ′p in which all steps
taken by any server q,q , p have been removed. Let β ′s be the
suffix of β after β ′p . Let βs be the subsequence of β ′s containing only
steps by p. Let βnew be βp · βs . We now argue that βnew is legal
from Ck−1. Because β ′p is a prefix of β , β ′p is legal from Ck−1. By
assumption, if p receives any message from any server q,q , p in
β ′p , the message has been sent in αk−1, i.e., before the prefix β ′p .
Moreover, by assumption, after αk−1, any server q,q , p sends no
message to cw so that after cw receives the message, cw sends a
message to p. By definition, β ′p ends with a message sent by cw to p
(if β ′p is not empty). It follows that if cw receives any message from
any server q,q , p in β ′p , then the message has been sent in αk−1,
i.e., before the prefix β ′p . Thus, βp is legal from Ck−1. Moreover,
RC(Ck−1, β ′p ) and RC(Ck−1, βp ) are indistinguishable to p and cw .
We next argue that βs is legal from RC(Ck−1, β ′p ). We notice
that in βs , only p takes steps. Then because RC(Ck−1, β ′p ) and
RC(Ck−1, βp ) are indistinguishable to p, by arguing that βs is legal
fromRC(Ck−1, β ′p ), we also argue that βs is legal fromRC(Ck−1, βp ).
Below we argue that βs is indeed legal from RC(Ck−1, β ′p ). By as-
sumption, if p receives any message from any server q,q , p in βs ,
then the message has been sent in αk−1, i.e., before β . By defini-
tion of β ′s , cw does not send any message to p in β ′s , (because all
messages from cw to p are sent in or before β ′p ), so any message p
receives from cw in βs has been sent in or before β ′p . Thus βs is legal
from RC(Ck−1, β ′p ), and βs is legal from RC(Ck−1, βp ). Moreover,
by arguing that βs is legal from RC(Ck−1, β ′p ), we also show that
RC(Ck−1, β ′p · βs ) andCv = RC(Ck−1, β ′p · β ′s ) are indistinguishable
to p. Because RC(Ck−1, β ′p ) and RC(Ck−1, βp ) are indistinguishable
to p, it follows that RC(Ck−1, βnew ) and Cv are indistinguishable
to p.
To construct γ , we have to utilize executions σold (Ck−1,p, ckr )
and σnew (Cv ,p, ckr )and refer to configurationCnew (Cv ,p, ckr ). (For
simplicity, we omit (Ck−1,p, ckr ) and (Cv ,p, ckr ) from the notations
below.) Specifically, starting from Ck−1, σold is first applied. Re-
call that for any server q,q , p, in its last step of σold , q sends
at most one message mo′q to ckr . Since Ck−1 and RC(Ck−1,σold )
are indistinguishable to cw and p, and since only cw and p take
steps in βnew , βnew is legal from RC(Ck−1,σold ). So, to construct
γ , βnew is applied from RC(Ck−1,σold ). The resulting configu-
ration is RC(Ck−1,σold · βnew ). Since the processes which take
steps in σold and βnew are disjoint, then RC(Ck−1,σold · βnew )
and RC(Ck−1, βnew · σold ) are indistinguishable. Recall that to
p, RC(Ck−1, βnew ) and Cv are indistinguishable. Therefore, to p,
RC(Ck−1, βnew ·σold ) andCnew are indistinguishable. Because only
p takes steps in σnew , σnew is therefore legal from RC(Ck−1, βnew ·
σold ) and also legal from RC(Ck−1,σold · βnew ). We apply it from
RC(Ck−1,σold · βnew ). Recall that in the last step of σnew , p sends
a message mn′p to ckr . Finally, mo′q for any server q,q , p (if q
sends a response) andmn′p are delivered in γ , and next, ckr takes
steps. Since Tr is a fast transaction, Tr completes. This concludes
the construction of γ .
In γ , ckr executes only transaction Tr . Thus, ckr decides the re-
sponse for Tr based solely on the values included inmo′q for any
server q,q , p and mn′p . Since mo′q for any server q,q , p is
sent in γold (Ck−1,p, ckr ), by Observation 5 and the one-value mes-
sages property,mo′q for any server q,q , p contains no value in
{x0,x1, . . . ,xN }. Recall thatmn′p is sent in γnew . By Observation
6 and the one-value messages property, mn′p contains values in
{x0,x1, . . . ,xN }. It follows that in γ , the return value of ckr for Tr
can be neither (x in0 ,x in1 , . . . ,x inN ) nor (x0,x1, . . . ,xN ). This contra-
dicts Observation 3.
To prove claim 2, we use similar arguments as those in the proof
of Lemma 5 with configuration Ck−1 playing the role of CE0 and
configuration Ck playing the role of C1. We assume that the claim
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does not hold. We construct an execution δ and show that δ con-
tradicts Observation 3. The construction of δ utilizes the same
execution σold (Ck−1,p, ckr ) as in the proof of claim 1. Starting from
Ck−1, cw and all servers take steps as defined in α ′k . We then de-
fine executions ρ and ρnew in a way similar to β and βnew de-
fined in the proof of Lemma 5 (but with Ck−1 playing the role of
CE0 and Ck playing the role of C1). We finally define δ based on
σold (Ck−1,p, ckr ), σnew (Ck ,p, ckr ) and ρnew , and we argue that in
δ , ckr returns a response for Tr that contradicts Observation 3.
We now present the details of the proof. Assume that inCk , xi is
visible for some i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,N }. We will derive a contradiction by
constructing an execution δ where in addition to Tw , a read-only
transactionTr = (r (X0)∗, r (X1)∗, . . . , r (XN )∗ is invoked by a client
ckr not in {cw , cin0 , cin1 , . . . , cinN } and ckr returns from Tr . We will
show that δ contradicts Observation 3.
We construct δ by utilizing γold (Ck−1,p, ckr ) and γnew (Ck ,p, ckr ).
By Observation 5, ckr returns (x in0 ,x in1 , . . . ,x inN ) forTr inγold (Ck−1,
p, ckr ). Because by assumption, xi is visible at Ck , Observation 6
implies that ckr returns (x0,x1, . . . ,xN ) forTr inγnew (Ck ,pk%2, ckr ).
To construct δ , we first define an execution ρ and some subse-
quences of it, and we study their properties. Let ρ be the sequence of
steps which are taken fromCk−1 toCk . Let ρ ′p be the shortest prefix
of ρ which contains all messages sent by cw to p. Let ρp be the
subsequence of ρ ′p in which all steps taken by any server q,q , p
have been removed. Let ρ ′s be the suffix of ρ after ρ ′p . Let ρs be the
subsequence of ρ ′s containing only steps by p. Let ρnew be ρp · ρs .
We now argue that ρnew is legal from Ck−1. Because ρ ′p is a prefix
of ρ, ρ ′p is legal fromCk−1. By the definition of αk , if p receives any
message from any server q,q , p in β ′p , the message has been sent
in αk−1, i.e., before the prefix β ′p . Moreover, because α ′k ends with
the first message sent by some server to another server (implicitly
or explicitly), cw receives no message from any server q,q , p such
that after the receipt of this message, cw sends a message to p. By
definition, ρ ′p ends with a message sent by cw to p (if ρ ′p is not
empty). It follows that if cw receives any message from any server
q,q , p in ρ ′p , then the message has been sent in αk−1, i.e., before
the prefix ρ ′p . Thus, ρp is legal from Ck−1. Moreover, RC(Ck−1, ρ ′p )
and RC(Ck−1, ρp ) are indistinguishable to p and cw .
We next argue that ρs is legal from RC(Ck−1, ρ ′p ). We notice
that in ρs , only p takes steps. Then because RC(Ck−1, ρ ′p ) and
RC(Ck−1, ρp ) are indistinguishable to p, by arguing that ρs is legal
fromRC(Ck−1, ρ ′p ), we also argue that ρs is legal fromRC(Ck−1, ρp ).
Below we argue that ρs is indeed legal from RC(Ck−1, ρ ′p ). By the
definition of αk , if p receives any message from any server q,q , p
in ρs , then the message has been sent in αk−1, i.e., before ρ. By
definition of ρ ′s , cw does not send any message to p in ρ ′s , (because
all messages from cw top are sent in or before ρ ′p ), so any messagep
receives from cw in ρs has been sent in or before ρ ′p . Thus ρs is legal
from RC(Ck−1, ρ ′p ), and ρs is legal from RC(Ck−1, ρp ). Moreover,
by arguing that ρs is legal from RC(Ck−1, ρ ′p ), we also show that
RC(Ck−1, ρ ′p · ρs ) andCk = RC(Ck−1, ρ ′p · ρ ′s ) are indistinguishable
to p. Because RC(Ck−1, ρ ′p ) and RC(Ck−1, ρp ) are indistinguishable
to p, it follows that RC(Ck−1, ρnew ) and Ck are indistinguishable
to p.
Nowwe are ready to constructδ using executionsσold (Ck−1,p, ckr ),
σnew (Ck ,p, ckr ) and ρnew , referring to configurationCnew (Ck ,p, ckr ).
(For simplicity, we omit (Ck−1,p, ckr ) and (Ck ,p, ckr ) from the no-
tations below, which abuses σnew and Cnew .) Starting from Ck−1,
σold is first applied. Recall that in its last step of σold , any server
q,q , p sends at most one message mo′q to ckr . Since Ck−1 and
RC(Ck−1,σold ) are indistinguishable to cw and p, and since only
cw and p take steps in ρnew , ρnew is legal from RC(Ck−1,σold ).
The resulting configuration is RC(Ck−1,σold · ρnew ). Since the
processes which take steps in σold and ρnew are disjoint, then
RC(Ck−1,σold · ρnew ) and RC(Ck−1, ρnew ·σold ) are indistinguish-
able. Recall that to p, RC(Ck−1, ρnew ) andCk are indistinguishable.
Therefore, to p, RC(Ck−1, ρnew · σold ) and Cnew are indistinguish-
able. Because only p takes steps in σnew , σnew is therefore legal
from RC(Ck−1, ρnew · σold ) and also legal from RC(Ck−1,σold ·
ρnew ). We apply it from RC(Ck−1,σold · ρnew ). Recall that in the
last step of σnew , p sends messagemn′p to ckr . Finally,mo′q for any
server q,q , p (if q sends a response) andmn′p are delivered in δ ,
and next, ckr takes steps. SinceTr is a fast transaction,Tr completes.
This concludes the construction of δ .
In δ , ckr executes only transaction Tr . Thus, ckr decides the re-
sponse for Tr based solely on the values included inmo′q for any
server q,q , p and mn′p . Since mo′q for any server q,q , p is
sent in γold (Ck−1,p, ckr ), by Observation 5 and the one-value mes-
sages property,mo′q for any server q,q , p contains no value in
{x0,x1, . . . ,xN }. Recall thatmn′p is sent in δnew . By Observation
6 and the one-value messages property, mn′p contains only val-
ues in {x0,x1, . . . ,xN }. It follows that in δ , the return value of ckr
for Tr can be neither (x in0 ,x in1 , . . . ,x inN ) nor (x0,x1, . . . ,xN ). This
contradicts Observation 3. It follows that claim 2 is true for k . □
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